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Lammon: Cumulative Finality

CUMULATIVE FINALITY
Bryan Lammon*
A proper notice of appeal is a necessary first step in
most federal appeals. But federal litigants sometimes
file their notice of appeal early, before district court
proceedings have ended. When those proceedingsfinally
end and no new notice is filed, the law of cumulative
finality determines what effect-if any-the premature
notice has. Sometimes the notice is effective and the
appeal proceeds as normal. Sometimes it's not, and
litigants lose their right to appeal.
At least, that's how the law of cumulative finality looks
from a distance. Up close, the courts of appeals are
hopelessly divided on matters of cumulative finality.
They disagree on what law governs cumulative finality
issues-whether they are governed solely by Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) or also by a common-law
cumulative finality doctrine that preceded the rule-and
under what conditions a premature notice of appeal is
saved. Three distinct approaches to cumulative finality
have emerged, resulting in a deep circuit split. To make
matters worse, decisions within several of the circuits
have applied different approaches, resulting in intracircuit divides.
This Article offers a fix. Neither the text of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure nor their history provide a clear
But looking to the
cumulative finality rule.
practicalitiesof the issue suggests allowing a subsequent
judgment to save any prematurely filed notice of appeal.
Doing so imposes few costs while preserving litigants'
right to appeal.

Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Ken Kilbert,
Andrew Pollis, Catherine Struve, and Evan Zoldan for their helpful comments. Thanks also
to the University of Toledo College of Law for providing summer funding for this project. And
special thanks to Nicole Porter.
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The current cumulative finality mess illuminates a
larger issue with the appellate jurisdiction literature
and its attendant reform efforts. The literaturehas long
maligned the unnecessarycomplexity and uncertainty of
the entire federal appellate jurisdiction regime and
advocated reform. But most of that literaturefocuses on
only one part of that regime-appeals before a final
Equally important are issues with
judgment.
determiningwhen district court proceedings have ended
and parties thus have a right to appeal. Cumulative
finality is only one piece in this other aspect of appellate
jurisdiction. There are more. Successful reform might
require establishing a new, clearer point at which
parties have a right to appeal. So this other aspect of
appellate jurisdiction needs similar attention if reform
is to succeed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most appeals in federal court begin with the filing of a notice of
appeal.1 As a general rule, litigants must wait until the end of
district court proceedings-when all issues have been decided and
the district court has entered a final judgment on the docket-before
filing a notice. 2 But sometimes they jump the gun and file their
notice after the district court has decided an issue but before the
entry of a judgment. 3 These notices are premature and thus
ineffective at the time they're filed. 4 Problems arise, however, if
these litigants fail to file another notice once district court
proceedings reach their end. As a technical matter, the party has
not filed a proper notice of appeal. And parties that do not file a
5
proper notice forfeit their right to appellate review.
To address this problem, courts and rulemakers developed the
cumulative finality doctrine.6 This rule of appellate jurisdiction
allows certain subsequent events to save a premature notice of
appeal filed after certain district court decisions.
The general rule cannot be stated any more precisely, however,
because the cumulative finality doctrine is currently a mess. The
doctrine arose as a judge-made rule in the 1960s and 1970s before
1 See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) ("The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."); Catlin v. United States,
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a "final decision" as one that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment"); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 54(a) (" 'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies."); FED. R. CIV. P. 58 (setting out the rules for entering a judgment).
3 See, e.g., Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 477 (4th Cir. 2015); In re
Woolsey, 696 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2012).
4 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1) (setting out the time for filing a notice of appeal in a civil
case); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1) (setting out the time for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal
case).
5 See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (holding that the timing requirements
for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case are jurisdictional and that courts cannot create
equitable exceptions to them).
6 See Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing
Approach and the InescapableAllure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction,51 U. RICH. L.
REV. 371, 402-05 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie] (describing the
development of the cumulative finality doctrine from the balancing approach established by
Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp.).
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it was codified in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2). But
no one knows exactly which aspects of the common-law doctrine
Nor does anyone know if Rule 4(a)(2)
Rule 4(a)(2) codified.
superseded and abrogated the common-law doctrine. Nor is anyone
really sure what Rule 4(a)(2) means. The Supreme Court has
interpreted it only once-in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors
Mortgage Insurance Co. -producing an opinion that then-Judge
Neil M. Gorsuch once described as "cryptic."
Despite this uncertainty, cumulative finality has gone largely
unstudied (and often unnoticed) in the appellate jurisdiction
literature.9 In this Article, I tackle the current cumulative finality
7 498 U.S. 269 (1991).
8 In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1271.
9 I have discussed cumulative finality as an example of courts of appeals taking a
balancing approach to appellate jurisdiction, though I only noted the current splits and
uncertainty in the law and left their further exploration for this Article. See Lammon,
Dizzying Gillespie, supranote 6, at 402-05. A student note from 2009 also tackled the subject.
See generally Lexia B. Krown, Note, Clarityas the Last Resort? Why FederalRule of Appellate
Procedure4 Should and Could Stipulate Which JudgmentsAre 'Tinal," 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1481
(2009). I have a much different take on the state of the law and recommend a different
resolution. After that (and as with many appellate jurisdiction issues), FederalPracticeand
Procedure probably contains the most in-depth discussion of cumulative finality. 15A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.9 (2d ed. 2017).
The section describing cumulative finality focuses primarily on the separate-but-related issue
of appeals taken after a series of district court decisions cumulatively resolve all issues in the
case. See id. Its discussion of cumulative finality-that is, when subsequent events give
effect to a premature notice of appeal-understates the current uncertainty in the courts of
appeals. See id. The section addressing Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) notes that courts
have reached inconsistent decisions on cumulative finality issues, but it does not make
obvious the problems in the current caselaw. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.5 (4th ed. 2017). The Federal Court of Appeals
Manualnotes the disagreement in the caselaw in some depth but does not address any ways
to fix the matter. See DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 7:6 (6th ed.
2017). Other treatises give cumulative finality less attention and present the law as more
settled than it currently is. See ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS:
JURISDICTION & PRACTICE § 9.3 (2017 ed.); 20 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 304.12 (3d ed.
2017). As for the journals and law reviews (besides the aforementioned Note), the coverage
has been minimal. See Katrina L. Smeltzer, Note, ADAPT of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority: The Third Circuit Correctly DeterminedPrematurelyAppealed Discovery
Orders Could Not Later Ripen with Subsequent Entry of Final Judgment but Failed to
Examine the Validity of the Criticized Cape May Greene Rule, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 807
(2007); Peter R. Afrasiabi, The Growing Circuit Split Over Whether Premature Notices of
Appeal PreserveAppellate Review, 55 FED. LAW., July 2008, at 42. The Advisory Committee
on Appellate Rules considered cumulative finality after the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in CHF Industries, Inc. v. Park B. Smith Inc. See Order Denying Certiorari, 558 U.S. 1023
(2009) (denying certiorari from Park B. Smith, Inc. v. CHF Indus., Inc., 309 F. App'x 411 (Fed.
Cir. 209) (per curiam)). The Committee discussed possible action on cumulative finality at
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mess. In doing so, I make three contributions to the law and
literature in this area.
First, building on an exhaustive study of the caselaw, I offer the
first comprehensive account of the current cumulative finality mess.
After studying over 200 court of appeals decisions on cumulative
finality issues, I have identified deep inter-circuit splits and intracircuit inconsistencies. Since FirsTier,appellate decisions are all
over the map on which district court decisions subsequent events
can save. Some hold that only appeals from final decisions-those
that resolve all outstanding issues in the district court-can be
saved by the entry of a final judgment. 10 I call this the "narrow"
approach to cumulative finality. Some hold that appeals from other
district court decisions-those that could be certified for an
intermediate appeal under Rule 54(b)-can be saved by a
subsequent judgment or Rule 54(b) certification.1 1 I call this the
"intermediate" approach. And some hold that nearly any district
court decision, no matter how interlocutory, can be saved by a
subsequent judgment. 12 I call this the "broad" approach. The courts
also disagree about the interaction between Rule 4(a)(2) and the
common-law doctrine that preceded it. Some courts hold that Rule
4(a)(2) is now the only source of law on cumulative finality.1 3 Others
have concluded that the common-law doctrine survived Rule 4(a)(2)
and continues to exist alongside it. 14 This is no ordinary split. In
addition to disagreement among the circuits in how to approach
matters of cumulative finality, many of the circuits have issued
four meetings, but eventually declined to address the issue. See Advisory Comm. on
Appellate Rules, Minutes of Fall 2011 Meeting, Item No. 1O-AP-A (premature notices of
appeal)(October 13-14, 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/appellate-minutes- 10-2011.pdf;
Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Minutes of Spring 2011 Meeting, Item No. 10-AP-A
(prematurenotices of appeal) (April 6-7, 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/appellate-minutes-04-201 l.pdf;
Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Minutes of Fall 2010 Meeting, Item No. IO-AP-A
(prematurenotices of appeal) (October 7-8, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/APl0-2010-min.pdf;
Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, Minutes of Spring 2010 Meeting, Item No. 1O-AP-A
(prematurenotices of appeal) (April 8-9, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr-import/APO4-2010-min.pdf.
10 See, e.g., Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
11 See, e.g., Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 161-62 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
12 See, e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1999).
13 See, e.g., Outlaw, 412 F.3d at 160.
14 See, e.g., Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 587.
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decisions disagreeing with their own precedent. Litigants in these
circuits thus have no guidance on which rules of cumulative finality
govern them.
Second, I advocate a fix: reinterpreting or amending Rule 4(a)(2)
to give effect to almost any notice of appeal filed before the entry of
judgment. The current cumulative finality mess comes from the
Supreme Court's decision in FirsTier. But FirsTier got Rule
The FirsTier Court overlooked the
4(a)(2)'s meaning wrong.
ambiguities in the rule's text and history, and the Court failed to
understand that in nearly all cases a premature notice of appealand allowing a subsequent judgment to give effect to that noticedoes no harm. Despite this minimal (if existent) harm, the narrow
and intermediate approaches that FirsTierproduced have allowed
courts to dismiss appeals because of a minor procedural misstep. In
other words, litigants are losing their opportunity to appeal for no
good reason. The better approach is the broad one-to allow a
subsequent judgment to save any prematurely filed notice of appeal.
I ultimately argue that either the Supreme Court should correct its
reading of Rule 4(a)(2) or the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (which is often simply called the "Rules Committee")
should amend Rule 4(a)(2) to clearly adopt the broad approach.
Third, I use the current cumulative finality situation to illustrate
a gap in the appellate jurisdiction literature, namely the insufficient
attention given to the problems of clearly defining when litigants
can appeal after a final judgment. Most articles on appellate
jurisdiction (my own included) focus on appeals before a final
judgment. 15 To be sure, this attention is deserved. Appeals before
15 See generally, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The CollateralOrderDoctrine:A New "Serbonian
Bog" and FourProposalsfor Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998); Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., The
Final Judgment Rule and Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders: Time for a Change, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041 (1980); Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil InterlocutoryAppeals
Act, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1984); Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction:Federal
Civil Appeals in Context, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1984); Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan
B. Morrison, DiscretionaryAppellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It's Time to Change the
Rules, 1 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999); Kristin B. Gerdy, "Important"and "Irreversible"
but Maybe Not "Unreviewable" The Dilemma of ProtectingDefendants' Rights Through the
Collateral Order Doctrine, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 213 (2004); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and
Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175
(2001); Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267
(2017); Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 6; Bryan Lammon, Perlman Appeals After
Mohawk, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Lammon, Perlman Appeals]; Bryan
Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction,74 OHIO ST. L.J.
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a final judgment have been one of the most persistently vexing
issues in federal procedure, and the law governing those appeals
has been continually subject to criticism and a constant target of
reform efforts. 16 But appeals before a final judgment are only one
side of appellate jurisdiction. Appeals after a final judgment
produce their own problems. Although litigants have a right to
appeal once district court proceedings have ended, 17 it is not always
easy to determine when the end has come. The issues with defining
a final, appealable judgment merit consideration as well. And
defining a final, appealable judgment should probably be part of any
reform.
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I first provide background on
federal appellate jurisdiction generally and the unique problems
concerning the time for filing a notice of appeal.1 8 I then describe
the three major events in the history of cumulative finality that led
423 (2013) [hereinafter, Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation]; Lawyers
Conference Comm. on Fed. Courts & the Judiciary, The FinalityRule: A Proposalfor Change,
19 JUDGES' J., no. 4, 1980, at 33; Robert J. Martineau, DefiningFinality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Aaron R. Petty,
The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction,62 S.C. L. REV. 353 (2010); James E. Pfander
& David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement of the Parties:A Preliminary
Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043 (2011); Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five
and Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711 (2013) [hereinafter Pollis, Rule 54(b)]; Andrew
S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2011) [hereinafter Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation];
Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 89 (1975); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in
Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for HandlingPrivilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733
(2006); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory
Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990); Adam N. Steinman,
Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction,48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007); Melissa A. Waters, Common
Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort
Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002); Brad D. Feldman, Note, An Appeal for Immediate
Appealability:Applying the CollateralOrder Doctrine to OrdersDenying Appointed Counsel
in Civil Rights Cases, 99 GEO. L.J. 1717 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, Comment, The
Appealability of OrdersDenying Motions for Disqualificationof Counsel in the FederalCourts,
45 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1978); John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory
Appeals Jurisprudencewith DiscretionaryReview, 44 DUKE L.J. 200 (1994).
16 See, e.g., Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 6, at 415-18; Martineau, supra note
15, at 770-87; Pollis, Rule 54(b), supra note 15, at 757-60; Steinman, supra note 15, at 127688.
17 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
18 1 focus entirely on cumulative finality in civil cases. Criminal cases can pose their own
unique cumulative finality issues. But this matter arises largely in the civil context, so I
confine my analysis to that.
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to the current situation: (1) the courts of appeals' early decisions
developing the common-law cumulative finality doctrine; (2) the
1979 addition of Rule 4(a)(2) to the Rules of Appellate Procedure;
and (3) the Supreme Court's 1991 decision interpreting Rule 4(a)(2),
FirsTier. In Part III, I explore the current state of affairs in the
courts of appeals. I describe the three approaches to cumulative
finality and the mess of decisions that the courts of appeals have
produced. I then offer the fix in Part IV. I show where FirsTier
went wrong and explain the best interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2),
ultimately advocating that the Court overrule FirsTieror the Rules
Committee amend Rule 4(a)(2) to clearly adopt the broad approach
to cumulative finality. I end Part IV by briefly discussing the need
for the appellate jurisdiction literature to explore the jurisdictional
problems that arise in appeals after-rather than before-a final
judgment. In Part V, I briefly conclude.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PREMATURE APPEALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CUMULATIVE FINALITY

Before delving into the current state of affairs in the courts of
appeals, some background is in order. In this Part I briefly
introduce the general rules governing the timing of appeals in
federal court, focusing particularly on when federal litigants
might-and when they must-file a notice of appeal. I then turn to
the development of cumulative finality, from its beginning as a
common-law doctrine in the courts of appeals, to its apparent
codification in Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2), to the Supreme
Court's only decision on Rule 4(a)(2)'s scope, FirsTier.
A. A SKETCH OF FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND NOTICES OF
APPEAL

As a general rule, federal litigants must wait until the end of
district court proceedings-when all issues have been decided and
all that remains is enforcing the judgment-before they can appeal.
This is the federal final-judgment rule. 19 It stems from 28 U.S.C.

19

See, e.g., Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867-68 (1994); Abney

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977); see also Petty, supra note 15, at 356-60
(discussing the final-judgment rule's history).
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§ 1291, which gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over only "final
decisions" by the district courts. 20 A decision that resolves all
outstanding issues in the district court is a "final decision." 2 1 For
most federal litigants, their one and only appeal comes after this
final judgment.
Like any rule, the final-judgment rule has
22
exceptions. In fact, it has many exceptions. 23 Sometimes a litigant
can appeal after the district court enters an order that resolves
some-but not all-outstanding issues. I can ignore the intricacies
of these exceptions (and they are intricate) for now. It's enough to
say at this point that the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction over an
appeal until a district court has entered a final judgment or other
appealable order. And, again, most litigants' one and only appeal
comes after a final judgment.
Most appeals in federal court begin with the filing of a notice of
appeal. 24 A proper notice of appeal effectively transfers a case from
the district court to the court of appeals. To be proper, a notice of
appeal must satisfy essentially two requirements.
The first concerns the content of a notice, and it's largely
straightforward. In most instances, the notice need only specify the
appealing party, the order or judgment appealed from, and the court
to which the party is appealing. 25 Although disputes as to the

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a "final decision" as one
that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment").
22 Some of these exceptions deem particular kinds of district court orders "final decisions"
as that term is used in § 1291, even though those decisions don't mark the end of district
court proceedings. Other exceptions allow the immediate appeal of certain district court
decisions despite the order not qualifying as a "final decision." I have argued (and continue
to believe) it's best to call any situation in which someone can appeal before a final judgment
an "exception" to the final-judgment rule. See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 15, at
27-28; Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation,supra note 15, at 447 n.118.
23 For more in-depth discussions of the exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see Glynn,
supra note 15, at 185-201; Martineau, supra note 15, at 729-47; Petty, supranote 15, at 36093; Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 15, at 1652-59; Steinman, supra note 15, at
1244-72.
24 See FED. R. App. P. 3(a)(1). Not all appeals begin this way. Discretionary appeals, for
example, begin with the filing of a petition for permission to appeal. See FED. R. APP. P.
5(a)(1). An appeal in post-conviction proceedings can begin with the filing of a request for a
certificate of appealability. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
25 FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1).
20

21
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adequacy of a notice sometimes arise, courts are to take a generous
26
view of a notice's adequacy.
The second requirement concerns timing. By both statute and
rule, Congress has imposed certain deadlines for filing a notice of
appeal. 27 In most civil cases, parties have thirty days after the entry
of the order or judgment being appealed to file their notice. 28 When
the United States is a party to a civil case, the time for filing is sixty
days. 29 In most cases, complying with these deadlines for filing a
notice of appeal is simple. But these seemingly straightforward
deadlines sometimes prove problematic.
Parties occasionally file their notice after the period for doing so
has expired. In Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court held that a
late-filed notice in a civil case is ineffective. 30 The time limits for
filing a notice of appeal in a civil case come from a statute-28
U.S.C. § 2107. The Bowles Court reasoned that this statutory
period limited the courts of appeals' jurisdiction. 31 So the late-filed
notice deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction and required
32
dismissing the appeal.
Other times, parties file too early. As just mentioned, litigants
must wait for the district court to enter a judgment or appealable
33
order before the court of appeals has jurisdiction over their appeal.
But litigants don't always wait. They sometimes instead file a

26 See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(2) ("An appellant's failure to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for the
court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal."); FED. R.
APP. P. 3(c)(4) ("An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice
of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the
notice."); see also Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) ("Courts will liberally construe the
requirements of Rule 3.").
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2012); FED. R. APP. P. 4.
28

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

29 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

30 Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). For an in-depth discussion of late-filed
notices of appeal, see 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3950.5. Bowles was part of a larger
Supreme Court effort to clarify which rules are jurisdictional (and thus not open to judgemade exceptions) and which are claims -processing rules (and thus open to waiver and judgemade exceptions). See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210 ("[S]everal of our recent decisions have
undertaken to clarify the distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional
rules ...").
31 Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213.
32 Id. at 214.
33 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

11

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 3

778

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:767

notice of appeal after the district court makes a decision that is not
a final judgment or appealable order. The notice is thus premature.
For purposes of this Article, I can separate into three groups the
district court decisions that produce these premature appeals.
These three categories oversimplify the reality of federal appellate
jurisdiction, but additional detail and nuance are unnecessary for
present purposes.
These district court
First are traditional final decisions.
decisions resolve all outstanding issues in a case. A district court
might, for example, issue a written order dismissing a complaint
with prejudice or granting a party summary judgment on all claims.
Or a district court might announce these decisions orally at a
hearing. In either case, district court proceedings are essentially
done. All that remains is the formal entry of a judgment-a
separate document whose entry on the docket marks the end of
district court proceedings and begins the time for filing a notice of
34
appeal.
Technically speaking, a traditional final decision alone does not
begin the time for filing an appeal; that time generally does not
begin until entry of a judgment.3 5 And for most traditional final
decisions, entry of a judgment does not occur until the judgment is
entered on the docket in a separate document. 36 But since the
traditional final decision resolves all outstanding issues in the
district court, that separate document is often forthcoming; there is
rarely anything standing in its way. Even if no separate document
is ever issued, the judgment is considered entered 150 days after
the traditional final judgment is recorded on the docket. 37 And a
would-be appellant can waive the separate-document requirement
by filing a notice of appeal. 38 Still, until judgment is entered, the
time for taking an appeal has not begun to run.
Second are interlocutory decisions. These decisions resolve fewer
than all of the issues before a district court and are instead a step
toward a final decision. And district courts can make dozens of them
in the course of proceedings. Examples include orders denying a

34
35

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 58; FED. R. APP. P. 4.
See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2).

36

See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), (c).

37 FED. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B).
38 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(B).
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motion to dismiss, discovery orders, and orders sanctioning
attorneys.
Given the final-judgment rule, federal appellate courts do not
have jurisdiction to immediately review interlocutory decisions.
Litigants must wait until the end of district court proceedingswhen the district court has made the just-discussed traditional final
decision and entered the just-discussed judgment-before appealing
any interlocutory decision. Interlocutory decisions merge into the
final judgment and can be reviewed on an appeal from that
judgment. 39 Again, there are some exceptions to this that allow for
But
the immediate appeal of some interlocutory decisions. 40
appellate review of the vast majority of interlocutory decisions must
await a final judgment.
Unlike
Third are what I call "certifiably final decisions."
traditional final decisions, certifiably final decisions do not resolve
all outstanding issues in a case. They are, at least initially,
interlocutory. But so long as certain requirements are met, the
district court can certify these decisions for an immediate appeal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). This rule allows a
district court to certify for an immediate appeal an order deciding
41
some (but not all) claims in a multi-claim or multi-party suit.
District courts should do so only when there is no good reason to
delay an appeal of the order in question. 42 For example, a district
court might certify an order dismissing the claims against one
defendant in a multi-defendant suit.43 The plaintiff can then
immediately appeal that dismissal rather than wait until its claims
against the other defendants are resolved. So long as the issues
raised in the appeal are sufficiently different from those remaining

39 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (noting that
appeals are not permitted from decisions which "are but steps towards final judgment in
which they will merge").
40

See supra note 23.

41 See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ('When an action presents more than one claim for reliefwhether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than
all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.").
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Jewler v. District of Columbia, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016) (certifying
an order dismissing all claims against certain individual defendants in a multi-defendant
suit).
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in the trial court, this will likely make some sense; the dismissed
defendant would not need to wait until the other claims are resolved
(which could take years) before a final appellate resolution of the
plaintiffs claims against it. Once the district court makes the
certification, judgment is entered on the decision and it can be
immediately appealed.
A notice of appeal filed after any of these decisions-traditional
final decisions, interlocutory decisions, and certifiably final
decision-technically speaking, does not satisfy the timing
requirements of Rule 4, as there was no final judgment (or other
order) from which a proper appeal could be taken. The time for
44
filing a notice of appeal has accordingly not started.
By themselves, these premature notices do no real harm; they're
a nullity and can be ignored. Problems arise, however, when the
district court later enters an appealable order or a final judgment
and the litigant fails to file a new notice of appeal. Appellate courts
in this all-too-common situation are faced with a jurisdictional
quandary. The appellant filed a notice of appeal before there was a
final judgment, and that notice-absent a rule saving it-is
technically ineffective because it was not filed within the specified
time after entry of the order or judgment. The appellant also never
filed a proper notice of appeal after the eventual entry of the order
or judgment. The court arguably lacks appellate jurisdiction in this
scenario.
To solve this problem, courts, and later rulemakers, developed
the doctrine of cumulative finality.
B. CUMULATIVE FINALITY'S PAST

Three major events mark the history of the cumulative finality
doctrine: (1) the courts of appeals' early decisions developing the
common-law cumulative finality doctrine; (2) the 1979 addition of
Rule 4(a)(2) to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; and (3) the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision interpreting Rule 4(a)(2), FirsTier
45
Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co.

44 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) ("In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 4(a)(1)(B),
4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk
within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.").
45
498 U.S. 269 (1991).
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1. Early Cumulative Finality. A somewhat coherent doctrine on
cumulative finality initially emerged from a series of courts of
appeals decisions in the 1960s and 1970s. Most cumulative finality
issues arose in three contexts: (1) appeals from district courts
announcing their decisions but before entering a formal final
judgment (that is, appeals from traditional final decisions),
(2) appeals from orders dismissing a complaint but not an action,
and (3) appeals from orders dismissing some-but not all--of the
claims in a multi-claim or multi-party suit (that is, appeals from
certifiably final decisions). But courts also applied the cumulative
finality doctrine to appeals from interlocutory orders during this
time.
a. Appeals From Announced Decisions. The first group of cases
dealt with appeals from district court decisions before the formal
entry of judgment, or traditional final decisions. In Hodge v. Hodge,
for example, the Third Circuit held that a notice of appeal was
effective even though it was filed before the district court
memorialized its decision in a written judgment. 46 The appellant in
Hodge filed his notice of appeal after the district court had orally
announced its decision at a hearing but before the court entered a
written judgment. 47 Because there was no final judgment when the
notice was filed, the notice was premature and technically
ineffective. 48 On appeal, the court reasoned that "[s]o long as the
order [was] an appealable one and the non-appealing party [was]
not prejudiced by the prematurity. . . , the court of appeals should
proceed to. decide the case on the merits, rather than dismiss on the
'49
basis of such a technicality.
The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in Dougherty v.
Harper'sMagazine Co. 50 The district court in Dougherty dismissed
the plaintiffs claims, after which the plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal. 51 The district court entered a written final judgment several
months later.5 2 The Third Circuit, noting that it initially did not
46 Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1975).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.

50 537 F.2d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 1976).
51 Id. at 759.
52 Id. at 762 (noting that the notice of appeal was filed in May 1975, but that the district
court's judgment wasn't officially entered until January 1976).
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have jurisdiction, treated the early notice as if it had been filed from
the later judgment. 53 "[T]o do otherwise," the court said, "would be
54
a travesty of justice."
And in Sanchez v. Maher, the Second Circuit held that the entry
of a written judgment memorializing an earlier final decision saved
a premature notice of appeal. 55 The appellant in Sanchez filed its
notice after the district court announced its decision, but the formal
56
judgment was not entered until after oral argument in the appeal.
The Second Circuit reasoned that the subsequent entry of a
judgment, along with the lack of prejudice to appellees, rendered
57
the notice effective.
b. Appeals From Dismissals of Complaints. The second group
of cases dealt with a notice of appeal filed after the district court
had dismissed the complaint but before the court dismissed the
action.
Courts have generally distinguished between the
complaint-the plaintiffs pleading-and the action-the plaintiffs
claim against a defendant. Often the dismissal of a complaint
coincides with the dismissal of an action. But not always. A district
court can dismiss a complaint with leave to amend, giving the
plaintiff the opportunity to correct whatever was wrong.5 8 And a
district court order dismissing only a complaint is not a final,
appealable order; the action is still pending, and the plaintiff can
keep the case alive (or at least try to) by filing an amended pleading.
Finality comes only when the district court enters a judgment
dismissing the entire action.
Plaintiffs sometimes file a notice of appeal after the district court
dismisses a complaint but before the court dismisses the entire
action. Today this situation poses little trouble; the rule is now
firmly established that plaintiffs can signal their intent to rest on

53 Id.

54 Id. See also In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 376-77 (3d Cir.
1976) (holding that a notice of appeal was effective when it was filed after the district court
had announced its decision but before formal entry of a written order); Markham v. Holt, 369
F.2d 940, 941-42 (5th Cir. 1966) (same).
55 Sanchez v. Maher, 560 F.2d 1105, 1107 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).
56 Id.
57 Id.

58 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (allowing the court to freely grant leave to amend when
justice so requires).
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the original pleading by filing a notice of appeal. 59 But several
decades ago this situation led to litigation over appellate
jurisdiction, with courts asked to dismiss appeals due to the
prematurely filed notice.
Rather than dismiss the appeal, courts treated the early notice
as having been filed after the eventual final judgment. In Firchau
v. DiamondNational Corp., for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
a premature notice of appeal was saved by the subsequently entered
final judgment. 60 The plaintiffs in Firchau filed their notice of
appeal after the district court had dismissed their complaint but
three days before the court entered a final judgment dismissing the
action. 61 The court treated the notice as filed from the subsequent
final judgment and reasoned that the early filing was a mere
technical error that did not prejudice anyone. 62 The Ninth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in Ruby v. Secretary of the United
States Navy, where it stated-relying on Firchau-that"a notice of
appeal directed to [a] non-appealable order will be regarded ...as
directed to the subsequently-entered final decision." 63 And in
Lanning v. Serwold, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "special
circumstances" gave it jurisdiction over an appeal from the
dismissal of a complaint (but not an action); no amendment could
have saved the defects in the plaintiffs complaint, so the order
64
dismissing it was effectively final and appealable.
c. Appeals From Resolutions of Some Claims in Multi-Claim or
Multi-Defendant Suits. The final major group of early cumulative
finality cases addressed notices filed after the district court made a
certifiably final decision-one that resolved some (but not all) of the

59 See, e.g., Shott v. Katz, 829 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that "when a judge
conditionally dismisses a suit, but gives the plaintiff time to fix the problem that led to
dismissal.... the order becomes an appealable 'final decision' once the time for correction has
expired, whether or not the court enters a final judgment" (quoting Davis v. Advocate Health
Ctr. Patient Care Express, 523 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2008))).
6 Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1965).
61 Id. at 270.
62 Id. at 271 ("[W]e regard the notice of appeal here in question as directed to the final
judgment of dismissal, overlooking as a technical defect not affecting substantial rights, the
premature filing of that notice.").
63 Ruby v. Sec'y of U.S. Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1966).
64 Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716, 717 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973).
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claims in a multi-claim or multi-party suit.65 In one of the leading
early cumulative finality decisions, Jetco ElectronicsIndustries,Inc.
v. Gardiner,the Fifth Circuit held that a notice of appeal filed after
only some defendants had been dismissed was saved by the later
entry of a final judgment. 66 Jetco was a multi-defendant suit, and
the plaintiffs filed their only notice of appeal after the district court
had dismissed the claims against only one of the defendants. 67 The
Fifth Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs had appealed from a nonfinal order, and there was no Rule 54(b) certification that would
have permitted the appeal.68 But the court refused to "exalt form
over substance" and held that the premature notice of appeal,
"under the circumstances of [the] case," was sufficient to grant
6 9
appellate jurisdiction.
Many other cases followed Jetco's lead. In Richerson v. Jones,
the Third Circuit held "that a premature appeal taken from an order
which is not final but which is followed by an order that is final may
be regarded as an appeal from the final order in the absence of a
showing of prejudice to the other party."70 And in Merchants &
PlantersBank of Newport v. Smith, the Eighth Circuit held that it
had jurisdiction to review an order granting summary judgment in
favor of a defendant even though the defendant's counterclaims
7 1 It
were outstanding at the time the notice of appeal was filed.
wasn't until after oral argument in the court of appeals that the
defendant voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims.7 2 But once those
counterclaims were dismissed, "all the claims [had] been disposed
of in the district court, and that court's order [was] a final
73
appealable one."
65 In addition to the subsequently cited cases, see, for example, Morris v. Uhl & Lopez
Engineers,Inc., 442 F.2d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1971).
66 Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973).
67

Id.

68

Id.

69 Id. See also Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting
that Jetco would have saved a premature notice of appeal filed from the dismissal of some
claims in a multi-party suit if the other claims had been finally resolved by the time of the
appeal).
70 Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Plummer v. United States,
580 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1978).
71 Merchants & Planters Bank of Newport v. Smith, 516 F.2d 355, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam).
72

Id.

73

Id.
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Along these same lines, several early cumulative finality
decisions held that the subsequent entry of a Rule 54(b) certification
saved a premature notice of appeal.7 4 So long as the order was
certified before the appeal was decided, the premature notice was
effective. In Tilden FinancialCorp. v. Palo Tire Service, Inc., the
Third Circuit held that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification saved
a prematurely filed notice of appeal.75 The defendant in Tilden
Financial filed its notice of appeal after the district court had
granted summary judgment against it on the plaintiffs claims but
before the defendant's third-party complaint against a third-party
defendant was resolved.7 6 After the notice was filed but before
disposition on appeal, the defendant obtained a Rule 54(b)
certification. 77 The Third Circuit determined that the reasoning of
its decision in Richerson applied similarly to certified orders
because "a Rule 54(b) certification creates a final order under
§ 129J."78 Since there was no prejudice from doing so, the court
treated the premature appeal as an appeal from the certified
79
order.
Similarly, the Second Circuit held in Gumer v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co. that a notice was effective even though the plaintiff
had appealed before the district court certified the appeal under
Rule 54(b).80 The court noted that it was technically without
jurisdiction since no Rule 54(b) certification had been made when
the notice of appeal was filed, and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to enter a certification without the appellate court's
The Second Circuit decided to "pass over this
permission.8 1

74 In contrast, some decisions from this time held or suggested that the district court could
not certify a decision under Rule 54(b) after the notice of appeal had been filed. See, e.g.,
Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978); Williams v.
Bernhardt Bros. Tugboat Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 883, 884 (7th Cir. 1966). These cases have
subsequently been rejected. See, e.g., Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 9, § 3950.5 ("The weight of authority holds
that an appeal from a clearly non-appealable order fails to oust district court authority; older
cases holding to the contrary have been rejected." (footnotes omitted)).
75 Tilden Fin. Corp. v. Palo Tire Serv., Inc., 596 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1979).
76 Id. at 606.
77

Id.

78

Id. at 607.

79 Id.; see also Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 955 n.4 (3d Cir. 1980).
80 Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1974).
81 Id.
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technical defect," however, since it could be easily cured on
82
remand.
d. Other Early Cumulative FinalityDecisions. Not every early
cumulative finality decision fit into one of these categories. Some
decisions allowed subsequent events to save a notice of appeal filed
from a clearly interlocutory order. In Curtis Gallery & Library, Inc.
v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that a notice of appeal from
a grant of summary judgment was effective even though the
computation of damages remained outstanding.8 3 The district court
in Curtis Gallery had determined liability but left open the question
of damages, noting that it would hold a hearing to determine any
amounts due.8 4 But before that hearing the plaintiffs filed their
notice of appeal, and the district court entered a final judgment
several months later.85 A decision on liability but not damages is
interlocutory-the appeal must await the damages determination
so that both can be addressed in a single appeal. Applying Ruby v.
Secretary of the United States Navy, however, the Ninth Circuit
86
treated the notice of appeal as premature but ultimately effective.
Both the court and the appellee knew from the plaintiffs' filings that
they intended to appeal the eventual final judgment.8 7 There was
thus no harm in treating the notice as if it had been filed after the
final judgment.
Similarly, in Eason v. Dickson, the Ninth Circuit held that a
notice of appeal filed from an order refusing to convene a threejudge panel was effective to appeal from a later final judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs claims.8 8 Like the order in Curtis Gallery,
this decision was interlocutory. But the Ninth Circuit thought its
cumulative finality decisions "suggested that the test was one of
prejudice or its absence; that if the premature notice did not
adversely 'affect substantial rights' of the prevailing adversary the
appeal was saved."8 9 Given that there was no suggestion of

82 Id.
83
84

Curtis Gallery & Library, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88
89

Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. (quoting Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1965)).
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prejudice to the appellant in Eason, the court deemed the premature
notice effective.9 0
As Eason illustrates, most early cumulative finality cases
focused on prejudice to the appellee: so long as there was no harm
from doing so, the later entry of a judgment saved the prematurely
filed notice of appeal. 91 Courts often noted that to do otherwise
would be needlessly technical and would violate the Supreme
92
Court's admonition that issues of finality be treated practically.
Not every decision from this time agreed.9 3 But the trend in the
caselaw seemed to be towards a broad concept of cumulative
finality.
2. Rule 4(a)(2). The second major development in cumulative
finality was the addition of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(2) in 1979. It now provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after
the court announces a decision or order-but before the entry of the
judgment or order-is treated as filed on the date of and after the
94
entry."
The new rule's purpose, according to the Advisory Committee
Notes, was "to avoid the loss of the right to appeal by filing the
notice of appeal prematurely."' 95 The Notes also indicated that the
Committee thought that it was codifying an existing practice in the
90 Id.

91 See id.; see also Tilden Fin. Corp. v. Palo Tire Serv., Inc., 596 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir.
1979) (holding that a premature notice of appeal was saved by subsequent events and noting
the lack of prejudice to the appellee); Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1979)
(same); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1978) (same); Sanchez v. Maher,
560 F.2d 1105, 1107 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977) (same); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922-23 (3d
Cir. 1977) (same); In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976)
(same); Morris v. Uhl & Lopez Eng'rs, Inc., 442 F.2d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1971) (same).
92 See, e.g., Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973). This
admonition comes from the Supreme Court's decisions in Cohen v.Beneficial IndustrialLoan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), and Gillespie v. United States Steel Co., 379 U.S. 148, 152
(1964).
93 See, e.g., Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978)
(dismissing an appeal despite a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification because the district court
lacked jurisdiction to certify its order after the notice of appeal had been filed); Williams v.
Bernhardt Bros. Tugboat Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1966) (same).
94 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). In its original form, Rule 4(a)(2) stated: "Except as provided in
(a)(4) of this Rule 4, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but
before the entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the
day thereof." 20 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 9, § 304App.02.
95 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee's note to 1979 amendment.
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courts of appeals, stating that even without a rule courts had
generally allowed subsequent events to save a premature notice of
appeal. 96 As examples of this practice, the Notes cited four of the
cases just discussed 97-In re Grand Jury Empaneled January 21,
1975,98 Hodge v. Hodge,99 Ruby v. Secretary of the United States
Navy, 10 0 and Firchauv. Diamond National Corp.10 1
Beyond mentioning these cases, however, the Notes did not
specify exactly how the new rule affected the existing common-law
cumulative finality doctrine. And the caselaw from this time does
not offer many hints. Despite the new rule, the courts of appeals
continued to develop cumulative finality as a largely judge-made
doctrine.
Most of the decisions from this era addressed whether a
subsequent judgment or Rule 54(b) certification could save a notice
filed after a certifiably final decision. And most of those decisions
held that they could. 10 2 There were some outliers, such as the Fifth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Taylor.10 3 Before Taylor, the
96 Id. ("Despite the absence of such a provision in Rule 4(a) the courts of appeals quite
generally have held premature appeals effective.").
97 Id.
98

See supra note 54.

99

See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.

100 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
102 For cases holding that the subsequent resolution of all remaining claims saved a notice
filed after a certifiably final decision, see generally Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077 (5th
Cir. 1990); Lovellette v. Southern Railway Co., 898 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Pinner,
891 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Ethridge v. HarborHouse Restaurant,861 F.2d
1389 (9th Cir. 1988); Dowling v. City of Philadelphia,855 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988); Sacks v.
Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Finn v. Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc., 821 F.2d
581 (11th Cir. 1987); Govern v. Meese, 811 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Fassettv.
Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986); Knight v. Brown Transport
Corp., 806 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1986); Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1986); Rivers
v. Washington County Board of Education, 770 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
Sandidge v. Salen Offshore DrillingCo., 764 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1985); Gillis v. United States
Department of Health & Human Services, 759 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1985); Presinzano v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 726 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1984); Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1981); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980); Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161
(5th Cir. 1980). For cases holding that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification saved notice filed
from a certifiably final judgment, see generally McLaughlin v. City of LaGrange, 662 F.2d
1385 (11th Cir. 1981); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Lewis
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that under
Rule 4(a)(2) a subsequent judgment or Rule 54(b) certification will save a notice filed after a
certifiably final decision and overturning prior Tenth Circuit cases holding to the contrary).
103 United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530, 531 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Fifth Circuit had issued several decisions holding that subsequent
events would save a notice filed after a certifiably final decision,
including Jetco, discussed above. 10 4 But one decision-Kirtlandv.
J. Ray McDermott & Co.-held to the contrary. 10 5 Citing to Kirtland
but not Jetco (or any other prior Fifth Circuit decision on the
matter), Taylor held that the subsequent dismissal of all
outstanding claims did not save the notice filed after only some of
the outstanding claims had been dismissed. 10 6 But the clear
majority of these cases gave effect to the premature notices.
When it came to appeals from interlocutory orders, the decisions
were more mixed. Some decisions disagreed, for example, about
whether the subsequent calculation of damages saved a notice filed
after a determination of liability. In Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate
Supplies, Inc., the Fifth Circuit suggested that it could. 10 7 The
notice in Alcorn County was filed after the district court had
08
determined liability, damages, and entitlement to attorney's fees.
But it came before the amount of those fees was determined.1 0 9 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit first determined that outstanding issues
regarding the amount of attorney's fees prevented a judgment from
being final. 110 But by the time the Fifth Circuit heard the appeal,
the district court had decided the amount of fees."1 Relying on its

104 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text; see also Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161,
1165 (5th Cir. 1980).
105 Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective and did not save a notice filed after
the district court had dismissed one defendant in a multi-defendant suit).
106 Taylor, 632 F.2d at 531. For other outliers from this time, see United States v. Ettrick
Wood Prods., Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1990) (addressing the propriety of a Rule
54(b) certification even though all claims had been resolved by the time of the appeal); Bode
v. Clark Equipment Co., 807 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that
subsequent entry of a final judgment resolving all claims did not save a notice filed from an
order apportioning settlement proceeds; " '[t]he finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 must
have been satisfied as of the date a notice of appeal is filed.'" (quoting Century Laminating,
Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1979))); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
Bluewater P'ship, 772 F.2d 565, 569 (9th Cir. 1985) (declining to apply "the rule that
subsequent events may cure premature notices of appeal").
1o7 Alcorn Cty. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1984).
108 Id. at 1163.

109

Id.

110 Id. at 1165.
11 Id. at 1165-66.
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pre-Rule 4(a)(2) decision in Jetco, the court concluded that this
112
subsequent decision saved the premature notice.
In General Television Arts, Inc. v. Southern Railway Co.,
however, the Eleventh Circuit held that the subsequent
determination of a damages award did not save a notice of appeal
filed after a determination of liability. 11 3 The district court in
General Television Arts had granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff on the issue of liability but left open the amount of
damages.1 14 Shortly after the defendant filed its notice of appeal,
the district court determined that amount.11 5 On appeal, the court
noted that Rule 4(a)(2) "was not intended to validate anticipatory
notices of appeal filed prior to the announcement of a final
judgment." 11 6 Citing Taylor, the court determined that the final
117
judgment did not save the premature notice.
Regardless of their outcomes, these cases are significant in their
ignorance of the new Rule 4(a)(2). Many decisions from this era did
not even mention it, relying instead on prior cumulative finality
decisions that often pre-dated Rule 4(a)(2). 118 These decisions
include leading cumulative finality cases from this period that are
still cited today. Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Co., for example,
became a leading Ninth Circuit decision on cumulative finality. 119
Anderson held that a notice of appeal from an order dismissing only
112 Id.

at 1166.

113 Gen. Television Arts, Inc. v. S. Ry. Co., 725 F.2d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984).

Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1330.
116 Id.
at 1330-31.
117 Id. at 1331.
118 See, e.g., Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1990) (relying on Jetco Elec.
Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973)); Lovellette v. S. Ry. Co., 898 F.2d
1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989)), and Baker v.
Limber, 647 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1981)); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1402
(9th Cir. 1988) (relying on Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980));
Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 1988) (relying on Richerson v.
Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1977)); Sacks v. Rothberg, 845 F.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(relying on, among other cases, Gillis v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565
(6th Cir. 1985), Alcorn Cty. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984),
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983), and Pireno v. N.Y. State
Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981)); Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 105 (2d
Cir. 1986) (relying on, among other cases, Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1979));
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 955 n.4 (3d Cir. 1980) (relying on Tilden Fin. Corp.
v. Palo Tire Serv., 596 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1979)).
119 See Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
114
115
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some of the defendants in a multi-defendant suit was saved by the
dismissal of the remaining claims. 120 Citing to several pre-Rule
4(a)(2) cumulative finality cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
these subsequent events saved the premature appeal. 121 The court
also noted that "[t]hese cases provide clear examples of giving a
practical rather than a technical construction to the finality rule,
122
without sacrificing the considerations underlying that rule."
Argued 12and decided in 1980, the court never mentioned Rule
4(a)(2). 1
Similarly, in Pireno v. New York State ChiropracticAssociationwhich has become a leading Second Circuit decision-the Second
Circuit held that the subsequent dismissal of the lone remaining
defendant saved a notice filed after dismissal of the other
defendants. 124 Citing Jetco, the Second Circuit concluded that the
earlier order became final and appealable on the date of the second
order, and the court treated the early notice of appeal as having
been timely filed thereafter. 125 Decided in 1981, the court never
126
mentioned Rule 4(a)(2).
When courts mentioned Rule 4(a)(2), no consensus emerged on
its relation to the common-law doctrine. In Cape May Greene, Inc.
v. Warren-the leading Third Circuit case from this period-the
Third Circuit apparently thought that Rule 4(a)(2) existed alongside
the cumulative finality doctrine.1 27 Cape May Greene held that the
subsequent dismissal of an outstanding cross-claim saved a notice

Id. at 680.
Id. at 680-81 (citing, among other cases, Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d
1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Sec'y of the U.S. Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1966);
Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1965)).
122 Id. at 681.
123 To be fair, it is not clear that Anderson should have applied Rule 4(a)(2). The new rule
took effect on August 1, 1979, and the Supreme Court ordered that it "shall govern all
appellate proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all
proceedings then pending." 441 U.S. 971 (1979). Although it is not clear from the Anderson
opinion when the notice in that case was filed, it may have been as early as 1978. See
Anderson, 630 F.2d at 680. My thanks to Catherine Struve for pointing this out.
124 Pireno v. N.Y. State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 389 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981).
125 Id.
126 The notice in Pireno was filed on April 18, 1979. Id. Like Anderson, this was before
Rule 4(a)(2)'s effective date, and so it is not clear that Pireno should have applied the new
rule. See supra note 123.
127 Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983).
120

121
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filed from the dismissal of the plaintiffs claims. 128 Relying on
Pirenoand Jetco, as well as its prior decision in Richerson, the Third
Circuit held that the premature notice of appeal became effective
when the cross-claim was dismissed. 129 Cape May Greene's brief
mention of Rule 4(a)(2) was confined to the discussion of whether a
recent Supreme Court decision-Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co. 130 -had abrogated these earlier cumulative finality
132
decisions.1 31 The court concluded that it had not.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Robinson v. Tanner also
suggested (albeit without much explanation) that the common-law
cumulative finality continued to coexist alongside Rule 4(a)(2).1 33 In
Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit tried at some length to reconcile its
various cumulative finality decisions (which included Fifth Circuit
decisions issued before the 1981 division into the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits).1 34 The Robinson court ultimately listed its prior decisions
(including Jetco) and Rule 4(a)(2) as distinct rules governing
different kinds of premature notices. 135 Jetco and other decisions
applied to notices "filed from an order dismissing a claim or party
and followed by a subsequent final judgment," while Rule 4(a)(2)
applied to notices "filed after the announcement of a decision or
136
order but before entry of the judgment or order."
In Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., the Tenth Circuit suggested that
Rule 4(a)(2) codified the common-law doctrine. 137 Lewis held that a
subsequent judgment or Rule 54(b) certification would save a notice

Id. at 184-85.
(citing Pireno v. N.Y. State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981); Richerson
v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228,
1231 (5th Cir. 1973)).
130 459 U.S. 56 (1982).
131 Cape May Greene, 698 F.2d at 185. Griggs had interpreted Rule 4(a)(4), which at the
time provided that a notice of appeal was ineffective if filed while certain post-trial motions
were pending; the notice was considered "a nullity," as if "no notice of appeal were filed at
all." 459 U.S. at 61. According to the Cape May Greene court, Rule 4(a)(2), when read
alongside Rule 4(a)(4), meant that "the prohibition against giving effect to premature notices
of appeal [is] confined to the specific instances cited in Rule 4(a)(4)." 698 F.2d at 185.
132 698 F.2d at 185.
133 Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378, 1385 (11th Cir. 1986).
134 See id. at 1382-85.
13
Id. at 1385.
128

129 Id.

136

Id.

137

Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988).
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of appeal filed after a certifiably final judgment. 138 The Lewis court
saw Rule 4(a)(2) as authority for this holding, and it cited to many
cases that, as the court noted, reached the same conclusion without
139
relying on Rule 4(a)(2).
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Alcom Electronic
Exchange, Inc. v. Burgess suggested that Rule 4(a)(2) abrogated the
common-law cumulative finality doctrine, retaining only the rule
that would give effect to a notice filed after a traditional final
decision. 140 The Alcom Electronic court stated that Rule 4(a)(2)not pre-Rule 4(a)(2) decisions like Jetco-governed the effect of a
premature notice of appeal. 14 1 Rule 4(a)(2), the court thought, gave
effect only to notices filed after a traditional final judgment.1 42 The
court seemed to recognize that although the Jetco decision would
reach the same result on a traditional final judgment, it would also
save many other premature notices that Rule 4(a)(2) would not.143
Indeed, were Jetco still good law, the court thought that it would
render Rule 4(a)(2) unnecessary. 44 The Alcom Electronic court
concluded, however, that it was bound by the Fifth Circuit's postRule 4(a)(2) decision holding that Jetco was still good law. 145 But it
was not alone in suggesting that Rule 4(a)(2) abrogated the
146
common-law cumulative finality doctrine.
So in the decade after the addition of Rule 4(a)(2), no one quite
knew how to reconcile it with the common-law cumulative finality
doctrine. Then came FirsTier.

138

Id.

139 Id. (citing Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 585 (11th Cir. 1987); Gillis
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Pireno v. N.Y.
State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, 389-90 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1980); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228,
1231 (5th Cir. 1973)).
140 Alcom Elec. Exch., Inc. v. Burgess, 849 F.2d 964, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1988).
141 Id. at 968.
142 Id. ("Looking at the terms of [Rule 4(a)(2)], it provides for the postponement of a
premature notice's effective date only where that notice is filed after announcement of final
judgment but before entry of that judgment.").
143

Id.

144 Id. at 968-69.

145 See id. at 969 (discussing Alcorn Cty. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160
(5th Cir. 1984)).
146 See generally Fadem v. United States, 42 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 1994) (Wiggins, J.,
dissenting).
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3. FirsTier. In 1991, the Supreme Court decided FirsTier
Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 147 its only
decision interpreting Rule 4(a)(2). The FirsTier Court held that
Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after a district court had
announced from the bench its decision to dismiss a case but before
it formally entered the final judgment of dismissal on the docket. 148
During a hearing on the FirsTierdefendant's motion for summary
judgment, the district court announced that it was granting the
motion and asked the defendant to submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. 149 But before the district court entered any
findings or conclusions (or a final judgment) the plaintiff filed its
notice of appeal. 150 About a month later, the district court finally
entered its findings and conclusions and issued a written final
judgment. 151 The plaintiff never filed a new notice of appeal.
The issue for the Supreme Court, then, was whether Rule 4(a)(2)
saved the FirsTier plaintiffs premature notice of appeal. 15 2 In
interpreting the rule, the Court first recognized that the rule
"codif[ied] a general practice in the courts of appeals of deeming
certain premature notices of appeal effective."'153 The Court also
noted the rationale for this general practice-namely, the lack of
prejudice to the appellee. 154 Relying on Firchau,Ruby, and other
pre-Rule 4(a)(2) cases, the Court reasoned that "Rule 4(a)(2) was
intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of appeal
from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a
final judgment, while failing to file a notice of appeal from the actual
final judgment."'155 Given that the plaintiff in FirsTier filed its
notice of appeal after the announcement of a decision that would
have been final if immediately followed by the entry of judgmentand given the reasonableness of the appellant's mistaken belief that

147 498 U.S. 269 (1991).
148 Id. at 270, 277.
149 Id. at 270-71.
150 Id. at 272.
151 Id.

Id.
153 Id. at 273.
154 See id. ('The Rule recognizes that, unlike a tardy notice of appeal, certain premature
notices do not prejudice the appellee and that the technical defect of prematurity therefore
should not be allowed to extinguish an otherwise proper appeal.").
155 Id. at 276.
152
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it had filed a proper notice-the Supreme Court concluded that Rule
4(a)(2) saved the plaintiffs premature notice of appeal. 156
The Supreme Court was careful, however, to say that Rule 4(a)(2)
would not necessarily save a notice of appeal filed from any order;
the Court listed discovery rulings and sanctions as examples of
orders Rule 4(a)(2) would not save. 157 The rule instead "permits a
notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of
appeal from the final judgment only when a district court announces
a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
1 58
entry of judgment."
FirsTier thus established that Rule 4(a)(2) would save a notice
filed after the announcement of a decision that would end district
court proceedings but before the formal entry of judgment. The
question remained, however, of what other orders could be saved by
Rule 4(a)(2) or a more general doctrine of cumulative finality. On
that issue, the courts quickly split.
III. CUMULATIVE FINALITY IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
After FirsTier,the courts of appeals developed three approaches
to cumulative finality. First is a narrow approach that limits the
cumulative finality doctrine to the scenario addressed in FirsTier,
i.e., notices filed after the district court announces a traditional final
decision but before formal entry of a written final judgment. 159
Second is a broad approach much like what existed in many courts
before Rule 4(a)(2) and FirsTier.160 Under this broad approach,
subsequent events can save premature appeals from a variety of
district court decisions. The third, intermediate approach falls
somewhere in between, allowing subsequent events to save a notice
filed after a certifiably final order-an order deciding some (but not
all) of the claims in a multi-claim or multi-defendant suit. Under
this intermediate approach, so long as the order appealed from
could have been certified for an immediate appeal under Rule 54(b),
the subsequent entry of an appealable judgment saves the
61
premature notice.1

157

Id. at 277.
Id. at 276.

158

Id.

156

159 See infra Part III.A.
160
161

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.B.
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This Part surveys these three approaches and their prevalence
in the courts of appeals. As will be seen, each approach has at least
one circuit that adheres to it. And several circuits have, on different
occasions, applied different approaches to cumulative finality.
A. THE NARROW APPROACH

One line of cases holds that Rule 4(a)(2) applies only in the
specific situation addressed in FirsTier: a district court announces
a decision that resolves all outstanding issues in a case and all that
remains is the entry of a written final judgment. This approach
rests on two premises. First, a notice of appeal filed before a final
judgment can be saved only as specified in Rule 4(a)(2)-that rule
abrogated whatever common-law cumulative finality doctrine
preceded it, and it now provides the sole means of saving a
premature notice. Second, when the FirsTier Court said that Rule
4(a)(2) saved only those decisions that would be appealable if
immediately followed by a final judgment, the Court meant only
decisions that resolve all outstanding issues in a case-traditional
final decisions.
So, for example, in Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., the Eighth
Circuit held that neither the cumulative finality doctrine nor Rule
4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed when a counterclaim remained
outstanding. 162 The plaintiff in Miller filed his notice after the
district court had granted summary judgment for the defendant on
the plaintiffs claims but before the court decided the defendant's
counterclaim. 163 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
premature notice was ineffective. The court rejected the cumulative
finality doctrine, claiming to be unaware of any Eighth Circuit
decision adopting the doctrine and "persuaded that such
experiments with 'pragmatic' application of the final judgment rule
are unwise."1 64 The court also held that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save
the notice.1 65 FirsTier, the Eighth Circuit noted, held that Rule
4(a)(2) "saves a premature appeal 'only when a district court
announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately
Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1033-34.
164 Id. at 1035. But see infra notes 202-207 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth
Circuit's history with cumulative finality).
165 Miller, 369 F.3d at 1035.
162
163
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followed by the entry of judgment.' "166 As the court saw it, there
was no such decision in Miller. The plaintiff in Miller had filed his
notice while an unresolved counterclaim was pending; because the
case was not yet over, the district court could not have entered a
final judgment. 167 The summary judgment order thus would not
have been appealable if followed by entry of a final judgment, and
168
Rule 4(a)(2) accordingly did not apply.
Similarly, in United States v. Cooper, the Fifth Circuit rejected
its earlier cumulative finality decisions and limited Rule 4(a)(2) to
16 9 The defendant in Cooper filed
the situation addressed in FirsTier.
a notice of appeal after a magistrate judge had issued a report and
recommendation but before the district court adopted the
recommendation.1 70 The Fifth Circuit held that the subsequent
adoption of the report and recommendation did not save the
premature notice.1 71
FirsTier, the court reasoned, "allows
premature appeals only where there has been a final decision,
rendered without a formal judgment."172 A recommendation is not
a final decision, so the notice was beyond saving.1 73 And in reaching
this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its earlier
cumulative finality decisions-allowing subsequent events to save
premature notices in a variety of situations-were abrogated by
FirsTier.174
The narrow approach has little going for it. Its reading of FirsTier
fails to appreciate that there is more than one type of appealable
judgment. To be sure, FirsTierlimited Rule 4(a)(2)'s application to
Id. (quoting FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991)).
Id. ("The infirmity in Mr. Miller's appeal, however, does not lie in the fact that the
district court had failed to issue its final order on the summary judgment that it announced
but rather in the fact that there was an unresolved claim pending in the district court when
Mr. Miller filed his notice of appeal.").
168
Id.
169 United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1998). Cooper addressed the scope
of then-Rule 4(b) (now Rule 4(b)(2)), which is nearly identical to Rule 4(a)(2) except that Rule
4(a)(2) applies in civil cases and Rule 4(b) applies in criminal cases. See id. at 962. The court
noted, however, that Rule 4(b) should be interpreted like the nearly identical Rule 4(a)(2),
including the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2) in FirsTier. See id. at 962, 962
166
167

n. 1.
170
171

Id. at 961.
Id. at 963.

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.
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decisions "that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
entry of judgment." 175 A traditional final decision certainly qualifies
under this rule.
But so too does an order that could be certified for an immediate
appeal under Rule 54(b). That rule expressly allows the district
court to "direct entry of a final judgment" as to fewer than all of the
claims or parties. 176 Once certified, the decision can be immediately
appealed. So orders that could be certified for an immediate appeal
under Rule 54(b) "would be appealable if immediately followed by
the entry of judgment" and should thus qualify under FirsTier. To
limit Rule 4(a)(2) to only traditional final decisions thus
misunderstands the meaning of the term "judgment."
B. THE INTERMEDIATE APPROACH

A second line of cases holds that Rule 4(a)(2) saves a premature
notice of appeal when the order appealed is either a traditional final
decision or an order that could be certified under Rule 54(b)-that
is, a certifiably final decision. Like the narrow approach, this
approach sees Rule 4(a)(2) as the sole source of cumulative finality
in civil cases; the rule superseded the common-law doctrine. But
unlike the narrow approach, these cases read FirsTier'sreference to
decisions "that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
entry of judgment" 177 to include more than traditional final
decisions. It also encompasses certifiably final orders. As just
discussed, an order so certified is a judgment, and that judgment
can be immediately appealed. So if an order could be certified under
Rule 54(b), it would be appealable if immediately followed by entry
of the certification, which would act as a judgment. This holds true
even if the order was never actually certified.
So in Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., the
D.C. Circuit-in an opinion by now-Chief Justice Roberts-held
that a notice filed from an order granting summary judgment for
some (but not all) defendants was saved by the later resolution of
all outstanding claims.17 8 The inquiry, the Outlaw court thought,

175
176
177
178

FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991).
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
498 U.S. at 276.
Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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was a hypothetical one: would the order have been appealable if
immediately followed by entry of a judgment? 179 A Rule 54(b)
certification is a type of judgment. 180 An order that could be certified
under Rule 54(b) is thus an order that would be appealable if
followed by the entry of judgment. The D.C. Circuit concluded that
so long as there was some judgment-either a Rule 54(b)
certification or a final judgment-before the appeal was heard, Rule
4(a)(2) would save the premature notice of appeal. 8 1
In contrast, this approach does not save appeals from
interlocutory orders that could not qualify for Rule 54(b)
certification. Several cases have held, for example, that notices filed
from a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are not saved
of the
adoption
subsequent
court's
the
district
by
recommendation. 8 2 The report and recommendation does not
decide a separate claim. It instead recommends a decision to the
district court, and it accordingly cannot be certified under Rule
54(b). Similarly, several cases have held that notices filed after
orders determining liability for damages, attorney's fees, or
sanctions are not saved by the subsequent determination of the
amount of those damages, attorney's fees, or sanctions.1 8 3 An order
179 Id. at 162.
180

Id. at 161.

181 Id.

at 161-62.

See, e.g., Turner v. Perry, 651 F. App'x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Because the magistrate
judge's recommendation was interlocutory and could not have been certified under Rule 54(b),
the doctrine of cumulative finality does not apply here."); Burnside v. Jacquez, 731 F.3d 874,
875-76 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Rule 4(a)(2) does not apply to appeals from a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation."); Demorest v. Ryan, 156 F. App'x 931, 932 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same); Perez-Priego v. Alachu Cty. Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272, 1273 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a magistrate's report and recommendation was neither final nor appealable);
Serine v. Peterson, 989 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing an appeal because the
"magistrate judge's order was not a final judgment").
183 See, e.g., Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding a notice
of appeal ineffective because the order appealed from "explicitly reserved the calculation of
fees"); Flynn v. Ohio Bldg. Restoration, Inc., 162 F. App'x 3, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that
the district court resolved "only the issue of liability, expressly requesting submissions from
the parties as to damages"); Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., No. 04-7092, 2004 WL
2713122, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 23, 2004) (holding that the order appealed from was not final
because it did not establish the amount of damages or attorney's fees); Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp.,
237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) ("An award of sanctions is not a final order, and thus not
appealable, until the district court determines the amount of the sanction."); cf. Duma v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 534 F. App'x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that a notice of appeal
was untimely because it was filed before the court determined an amount owed to the
government).
182
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deciding liability but not damages decides only part of a single
claim, not a separate claim. The Supreme Court has accordingly
held that such an order cannot be certified under Rule 54(b).1 84 The
order determining liability is thus not one that would be appealable
if followed immediately by entry of a judgment.
The intermediate approach is probably the best reading of
FirsTier. If FirsTier definitively set the scope of Rule 4(a)(2) (and,
as we'll see, there's some question whether it did), then Rule 4(a)(2)
applies only when a decision would be appealable if immediately
followed by entry of a judgment. Unlike the narrow approach, the
intermediate approach recognizes that there is more than one kind
of judgment. District court orders resolving some (but not all)
claims in a multi-claim or multi-party suit would be appealable if
immediately followed by a Rule 54(b) certification because that
certification produces an appealable judgment.
The problem with the intermediate approach (and, for the same
reasons, the narrow approach) is that it's still too narrow. As
discussed further below, the intermediate approach unnecessarily
denies appellate review to parties that file a notice of appeal, albeit
an early one. Parties lose their right to appeal for a minor error that
rarely causes any harm.
C. THE BROAD APPROACH

The broader approach to cumulative finality is much like the
earlier, pre-Rule 4(a)(2), pre-FirsTierapproach: a premature notice
of appeal is effective so long as (1) the district court has entered an
appealable order by the time the appeal is heard and (2) there is no
prejudice to the appellant. Indeed, under this approach, the
addition of Rule 4(a)(2) in 1979 did little, if anything, to the
cumulative finality doctrine; the doctrine continues to exist
alongside the rule. So FirsTier's interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2)
placed few (if any) limits on the broader cumulative finality
doctrine.
The Third Circuit's decision in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp. best
illustrates this broader approach.1 8 5 In Lazy Oil, objectors to a class
action settlement filed their notice of appeal after the district court
184
185

See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-44 (1976).
Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999).
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had approved the settlement but before the court approved the
allocation plan for the settlement proceeds.18 6 Relying on its preFirsTierdecision in Cape May Greene, the Third Circuit concluded
that the subsequent allocation and final judgment saved the
premature notice.1 8 7 The district court had entered a final judgment
before the Third Circuit decided the case, and no party claimed any
prejudice. Under the Cape May Greene approach, the premature
1 88
notice was both harmless and effective.
The Lazy Oil court recognized, however, that its decision-and
its earlier decision in Cape May Greene-couldnot be squared with
FirsTierand its interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2).18 9 The district court's
decision in FirsTierwould have been final and appealable if followed
by entry of a final judgment, while the district court order in Lazy
Oil would not-the district court still needed to approve an
allocation plan before it could enter a final judgment.1 90 So Rule
4(a)(2) could not be the tool for saving the notice of appeal in Lazy
Oil.
To resolve this tension, the Lazy Oil court concluded that
subsequent events could save a premature notice of appeal in a
variety of situations, and Rule 4(a)(2) addressed only one of them. 19 1
The broader approach to cumulative finality addressed others. To
hold otherwise, the court thought, would elevate a procedural

Id. at 585.
Id. at 585-86. For a discussion of Cape May Greene, see supra notes 127-132 and
accompanying text.
188 Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 585-86.
189 Id. at 586.
190 Id. at 585-86.
191 Id. at 587 ("FirsTiersimply limited the reach of Rule 4(a)(2)'s proviso. It did not hold
that the Rule 4(a)(2) situation-announcement of a final decision followed by notice of appeal
and then entry of the judgment is the only situation in which a premature notice of appeal
will ripen at a later date.... Thus, in a number of factual situations, a premature notice of
appeal will become effective at a later date."); see also Khan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 691 F.3d
488, 494 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012); DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215
(3d Cir. 2007) (noting that "Rule 4 does not exclusively govern every 'situation in which a
premature notice of appeal will ripen at a later date' "(quoting Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 587)).
The Lazy Oil court gave Rule 4(a)(4) as another situation in which subsequent events save a
premature notice of appeal. See Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 587. Rule 4(a)(4) provides that if
a notice of appeal is filed while certain post-trial motions are pending, the notice is treated
as if it was filed when the district court decides the last outstanding motion. See FED. R. APP.
P. 4(a)(4).
186
187
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"technicality" over the importance of resolving a case on its
19 2
merits.
As I discuss momentarily, the broader approach makes the most
sense as a policy matter. But it's difficult to reconcile with FirsTier.
The broader approach requires concluding either that FirsTierdid
not mean what it said or that Rule 4(a)(2) is superfluous (and thus
it was unnecessary for the Court to decide the rule's scope in
FirsTier). But neither of those explanations is very good.
First, although FirsTier is not clear, the Supreme Court likely
meant at least some of what it said. And some of what it said is
inconsistent with the broad approach. The Court said, for example,
that Rule 4(a)(2) would not save a notice filed from a discovery or
sanction order. 193 The broader approach, in contrast, would save
those notices, so long as district court proceedings had ended by the
time the appeal was heard and there was no prejudice to the
appellee. So the FirsTier Court probably meant to reject, at least
implicitly, the broader approach.
Second, courts should probably not render Rule 4(a)(2)
superfluous. And the current broader approach would do so. The
order at issue in FirsTierwould have been just as easily saved by a
broad common-law doctrine as it was by Rule 4(a)(2). If the two coexist, as the Third Circuit has suggested, any decision on Rule
4(a)(2)'s scope was unnecessary. Indeed, the rule itself would be
unnecessary, as a broad common-law doctrine would take care of
every situation in which it would apply. But rules generally mean
something. So we can't treat Rule 4(a)(2) as a narrow codification
of a broader doctrine that continues to exist alongside it.
D. THE STATE OF THE CIRCUITS

FirsTierand the decisions interpreting it have left a mess in the
courts of appeals: three different approaches, none all that
satisfying. But that's not all. The circuits themselves are deeply
divided. Not only have they created three different approachesand thus a split among the circuits-but they have also issued

192 Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 587 ("For us to decline jurisdiction in this appeal would elevate
a mere technicality above the important substantive issues here involved, as well as the right
of the parties in this case to have their dispute resolved on its merits.").
193 FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991).
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inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions within several of the circuits
themselves.
Some generalizations can be made. The narrow approach exists
primarily in the Eighth and Federal Circuits. 194 Most circuits-the
1 99 Ninth, 20 0 Tenth, 201
8
First, 195 Fourth, 196 Fifth,1 97 Sixth,19 Seventh,
Eleventh, 20 2 and D.C. Circuits 2 3-generally apply the intermediate
approach. As for the broader approach, it exists primarily in the
20 4
Second and Third Circuits.
194 The Eighth Circuit adopted the narrow approach in Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C.,
369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004), and regularly applies it. See Kramer v. Cash Link Sys.,
652 F.3d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 2011); Carter v. Ashland, Inc., 450 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 2006);
Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 446 F.3d 796, 798 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006); Dieser v.
Continental Cas. Co., 440 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2006). Most Federal Circuit decisions apply
the narrow approach, too. See Stoney Point Prods., Inc. v. Underwood, 15 F. App'x 828, 831
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware,, LLC, No. 99-1517, 2000
WL 987268, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2000). But see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. England, 313
F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (applying an intermediate-like approach to an appeal from
the Board of Contract Appeals).
195 See Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2006);
Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
196 See Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 478-79 (4th Cir. 2015); In re
Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2005); Equip. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Traverse Comput.
Brokers, 973 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992).
197 See Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Estate, 547 F.3d 273, 277 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2008); Boudreaux
v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 539 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631
(5th Cir. 2003); Young v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 634 n.2 (5th Cir.
2002); Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 379 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996); Riley v. Wooten, 999
F.2d 802, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1993).
198 See Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2009); Bonner v. Perry, 564
F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2009); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 104 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1997); Gillis
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1985).
199 See Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2011); Runyon v.
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 619 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2010); A. Bauer Mech., Inc. v. Joint
Arbitration Bd. of Plumbing Contractors' Ass'n & Chi. Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union
130, U.A., 562 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2009).
200 See Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 691
(9th Cir. 2010); Fadem v. United States, 42 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1994); Holden v. Hagopian,
978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir.
1980).
201 See Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2007); Ruiz v.
McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002); Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641,
645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
202 See Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d
1297, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2011); Martin v. Campbell, 692 F.2d 112, 114 (11th Cir. 1982).
203 See Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
204 See Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC, 723 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013); DL
Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2007); Swede v. Rochester
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But these generalizations do not capture the current state of
affairs. Consider the Eighth Circuit. Several years after FirsTier,
the Eighth Circuit held in Hill v. St. Louis University that Rule
4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court had
ordered sanctions but before it determined the amount of those
sanctions. 2 5 Citing Rule 4(a)(2) (but not mentioning FirsTier),the
court concluded that the notice was effective once the district court
determined the amount. 20 6 This conclusion required the broadest
approach to cumulative finality; the initial order, which did not
determine the amount of sanctions, was neither a traditional final
20 7
judgment nor a certifiably final judgment.
But seven years later, in the previously discussed Miller v.
Special Weapons, L.L.C., the Eighth Circuit claimed to be unaware
of any Eighth Circuit decision adopting the cumulative finality
doctrine and held that neither the cumulative finality doctrine nor
Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed when a counterclaim
remained outstanding. 20 8 This conclusion required the narrowest
approach to cumulative finality; the order could have been certified
for an immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) and so the notice would
have been effective under the intermediate or broad approach.
Since Miller, the Eighth Circuit has consistently refused to apply
Rule 4(a)(2) to anything but traditional final decisions. 20 9 But Hill
Carpenters Pension Fund, 467 F.3d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166
F.3d 581, 585-87 (3d Cir. 1999).
205 Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120-21 (8th Cir. 1997).
206 Id. at 1120.
207

Id.

Miller v. Special Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
209 See Kramer v. Cash Link Sys., 652 F.3d 840, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
notice of appeal filed after the dismissal of only one defendant in a multi-defendant suit was
not saved by the later liquidation of the remaining defendant); Carter v. Ashland, Inc., 450
F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed
after a dismissal order that left open the amount of sanctions but before the district court
determined the dollar amount); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 446 F.3d 796, 798
n.1 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction when the plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal after the district court had denied motions to compel but before it
granted summary judgment against the plaintiff); Dieser v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 440 F.3d 920, 924
(8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a premature notice of appeal filed after several determinations
of liability but before the calculation of pre-judgment interest was not saved by the later entry
of a final judgment); see also Detherage v. Barnhart, 91 F. App'x 520, 521-22 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding, in a pre-Miller decision, that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after
the district court refused to remand a suit to the Social Security Administration but before
entering a final judgment).
208
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has not been overturned. 2 10 It nominally remains good law and is
thus a source of potential confusion for litigants in the Eighth
Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit's cumulative finality caselaw is probably the
worst among the circuits. 2 11 Even before FirsTier,the Fifth Circuit
had issued a series of inconsistent decisions. In Alcorn County v.
U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., for example, the Fifth Circuit held
that a subsequent decision on the amount of attorney's fees saved a
notice of appeal filed after the district court had determined
liability, damages, and entitlement to attorney's fees. 212 This
decision seemed to adopt the broadest approach. In Tower v. Moss,
the court held that the subsequent dismissal of the sole outstanding
claim saved a notice of appeal filed from an earlier order dismissing
only some of the claims, which makes sense under either the broad
or intermediate approach. 2 13 But in United States v. Taylor, the
Fifth Circuit held that the subsequent dismissal of a plaintiffs
claims did not save the defendant's notice of appeal filed after the
dismissal of its counterclaims. 214 This decision required rejecting
the broad and intermediate approaches and instead applying the
21 5
narrowest.
Matters did not improve after FirsTier. The Fifth Circuit first
issued several decisions that seemed to adopt the intermediate
approach. In Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Fifth Circuit held
that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the claims of

210 The closest the Eighth Circuit has ever come was a parenthetical "but see" citation to
Hill after citing a string of decisions rejecting the cumulative finality doctrine. See Dieser,
440 F.3d at 925.
211 Of course, some Fifth Circuit decisions would have reached the same outcome regardless
of what approach the court applied. See, e.g., Lopez Dominguez v. Gulf Coast Marine &
Assocs., Inc., 607 F.3d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of
appeal filed after the defendants agreed to a district court-proposed stipulated dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds but before the court formally dismissed the case); Estrada v.
City of San Benito, 397 F. App'x 4, 6 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice
of appeal filed after the district court had dismissed some claims and announced that it would
dismiss the remaining for failure to prosecute unless good cause was shown). These decisions
create no issues for the Fifth Circuit's caselaw.
212 Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1984).
213 Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1980).
214 United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530, 531 (5th Cir. 1980).
215 See also United States v. Perez, 736 F.2d 236, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that that
a notice of appeal was ineffective when it was filed after a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation but before the district court's adoption of the report and recommendation).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

39

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 3

806

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:767

two groups of plaintiffs (out of three total groups of plaintiffs) were
dismissed. 2 16 These groups then filed their notice of appeal, but they
did not file a new one after the district court dismissed the
remaining group of plaintiffs and entered a final judgment. 2 17 The
Fifth Circuit held that Rule 4(a)(2), as interpreted in FirsTier,
applied-the district court's order "would have been appealable if
immediately followed by the entry of judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)." 218 In a footnote, the court noted that
it had previously taken a "more expansive" approach that allowed
appeals from clearly interlocutory orders, though it framed this as
an application of Rule 4(a)(2). 219 Because this case fell under the
more narrow FirstTier decision, the court did not address whether
220
its broader rule applied.
Then, in United States v. Cooper, the Fifth Circuit apparently
adopted the narrow approach, concluding that FirsTierabrogated
its earlier cumulative finality decisions. 22 1 Since Cooper, some Fifth
Circuit decisions have adhered to the narrow approach. In
McLaughlin v. Mississippi Power Co., for example, the Fifth Circuit
held that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after the
district court had dismissed some but not all claims in consolidated
cases but before the subsequent dismissal of the remaining
claims. 222 But other decisions have applied the intermediate
approach (often without even mentioning Cooper). In Miller v.
Gorski Wadyslaw Estate, the Fifth Circuit held that a premature
Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 378.
218 Id. at 379.
219 Id. at 379 n.5.
220 Id.; see also Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263, 265 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the resolution of all outstanding claims saved a notice of appeal filed after only some of those
claims had been dismissed); Riley v. Wooten, 999 F.2d 802, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the subsequent dismissal of the last remaining defendant saved a premature notice of
appeal).
221 United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1998). Cooper addressed the scope
of then-Rule 4(b) (now Rule 4(b)(2)), which is nearly identical to Rule 4(a)(2) except that Rule
4(a)(2) applies in civil cases and Rule 4(b) applies in criminal cases. Id. at 962. The court
noted, however, that Rule 4(b) should be interpreted like the nearly identical Rule 4(a)(2),
including the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2) in FirsTier. Id. at 962, 962 n. 1.
222 McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 351, 351 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam);
see also Star Ins. Co. v. Livestock Producers Inc., 34 F. App'x 151, 151 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after the district court had denied leave
to file an amended complaint (the motion was moot because partial summary judgment had
already been granted) and given the parties 30 days to reach an agreement on fees).
216
217
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notice of appeal filed after a partial grant of summary judgment
ripened at the later disposition of all outstanding issues. 223 And in
Boudreaux v. Swift Transportation Co., the Fifth Circuit held that
a premature notice of appeal filed after the district court had
granted summary judgment in favor of one defendant but before
dismissing the claims against a second defendant was saved by the
224
subsequent final judgment.
These decisions cannot be reconciled. Cooper and subsequent
cases taking the intermediate approach would be consistent if
Cooper were read to adopt the intermediate approach; some
language in the case suggests as much, 225 and the outcome would
have been the same since a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation is not a decision that could be certified for
immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). But the same cannot be said
for the decision in McLaughlin, which required application of the
narrow approach. All of these cases are ostensibly still good law
within the Fifth Circuit, so litigants in that circuit are left
wondering what rule will govern their particular case.
Some of the other circuits that generally follow the intermediate
approach have their own outlier decisions. The First Circuit, for
example, generally adheres to the intermediate approach. 226 But it
223 Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Estate, 547 F.3d 273, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008).
224 Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 539 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Cousin
v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal
filed after the district court dismissed claims against some (but not all) defendants but before
the district court certified that decision under Rule 54(b)); Young v. Equifax Credit Info.
Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 634 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a premature notice was saved
by the subsequent disposition of outstanding claims and parties when the order appealed
from would have been appealable if certified under Rule 54(b)).
225 Early in the Cooper opinion, the court said that an "appeal is proper where notice is filed
after the district court rules from the bench but before the disposition is entered as a final
judgment," citing with seeming approval Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co.. Cooper, 135 F.3d
at 962. The court also said that "[a]lthough an appeal need not be from a final judgment, still
it must be from a final decision." Id. And the Cooper court rejected the statement in Alcorn
County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc. that it "may consider a premature appeal in those
cases where judgment becomes final prior to disposition of the appeal." Cooper, 135 F.3d at
963 (quoting Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir.
1984)). One could read this as a rejection of only the broad approach.
226 See Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2006)
(holding that a premature notice of appeal filed after claims against only some of the
defendants in a multi-defendant suit were dismissed was saved by the later entry of a final
judgment); Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that Rule
4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court decided several claims but before
the district court certified those claims under Rule 54(b)).
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has applied the broader approach to appeals in the bankruptcy
context. 227 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit generally adheres to the
intermediate approach. 228 But not always. 229 The same goes for the
Ninth Circuit. It's post-FirsTier decisions generally follow the
intermediate approach. 2 30 But at least one decision required
227 See In re Watson, 403 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that an appeal filed from a
bankruptcy court's order denying a confirmation plan was saved by the bankruptcy court's
later order dismissing the case); see also In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504, 508-09
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that an appeal filed from a bankruptcy court's order directing the
payment of certain expenses was saved by the later resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings).
228 Compare Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court had granted
summary judgment in favor of all served defendants but before it dismissed the unserved
defendants), Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims saved a notice of appeal
filed after the district court had decided only some of the claims), Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d
1173, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (same), Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc., 283
F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (same), Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 529 n.2
(10th Cir. 1998) (same), and United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491, 1494-95 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification-although filed outside the time the
court gave to seek the certification-saved a premature notice), with Reed v. McKune, 153 F.
App'x 511, 514 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed
after the district court had denied motions for appointment of counsel and service of process
but before the district court dismissed the plaintiffs claims), and Judd v. Univ. of N.M., 204
F.3d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed
after the district court had entered an order proposing filing restrictions but before those
restrictions were actually imposed).
229 See Clementson v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 464 F. App'x 706, 709 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court had adopted a
magistrate judge's report and recommendation but before it ruled on a claim for injunctive
relief); Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
premature notice of appeal filed after the district court had denied the plaintiff in forma
pauperis status was saved by the later dismissal of his complaint for not paying the filing
fee); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Brockbank, 316 F. App'x 707, 710-11 (10th Cir.
2008) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court had
imposed a permanent injunction but before it set the scope of the injunction); Harbert v.
Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 391 F.3d 1140, 1144-46 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
subsequent final judgment fixing damages saved a notice of appeal filed after the district
court had determined liability); In re Interwest Bus. Equip., Inc., 23 F.3d 311, 314-15 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the subsequent approval of a bankruptcy saved a notice of appeal
filed from a bankruptcy court order denying approval of counsel's appointment due to a
conflict of interest); Dodd Ins. Servs. Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152, 1154 n.1
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a premature notice filed from an order imposing Rule 11
sanctions was saved by the later entry of a final judgment).
230 Compare Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684,
691 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims saved a
notice of appeal filed after the district court had decided only some of the claims), Fadem v.
United States, 42 F.3d 533, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the subsequent resolution of
outstanding consolidated cases saved a premature notice of appeal from the resolution of
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application of the broader approach. 23 1 Most Federal Circuit
decisions apply the narrow approach. 232 But that court has applied
something that looks like the intermediate approach in appeals
from the Board of Contract Appeals. 233 The Fourth,234 Sixth,235
some (but not all) of the consolidated cases), Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 584 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that a notice of appeal filed after an order granting summary judgment
against plaintiff on federal claims was saved by the later entry of a final order dismissing
remaining pendent state claims), and Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims saved a notice of
appeal filed after the dismissal of claims against only some of the defendants), with Hajro v.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding
there was no jurisdiction to review a permanent injunction when the notice of appeal was
filed before the terms of the injunction were set), Burnside v. Jacquez, 731 F.3d 874, 875-76
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a notice of appeal filed from a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation was not saved by the subsequent adoption of that recommendation),
Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a notice of
appeal was ineffective to appeal an award of attorneys' fees when it was filed before the
amount of fees was determined), In re Jack Raley Constr., Inc., 17 F.3d 291, 294-95 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that a subsequent final judgment did not save a notice of appeal filed from an
order granting summary judgment but leaving open the issue of pre-judgment interest), and
Serine v. Peterson, 989 F.2d 371, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the subsequent
dismissal of a case did not save a notice of appeal filed after a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation).
231 See In re Eastport Assocs., 935 F.2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that entry of a
final judgment saved an appeal from an order declining to abstain in a bankruptcy
proceeding; the court quoted its pre-FirsTier decision Anderson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 630
F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that "once a final judgment is entered, an
appeal from an order that otherwise would have been interlocutory is then appealable.").
232 See, e.g., Stoney Point Prods., Inc. v. Underwood, 15 F. App'x 828, 830-31 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that an appeal from "a judgment disposing of only some asserted claims" was
not saved by a subsequent final judgment); Meade Instruments Corp. v. Reddwarf Starware,
LLC, No. 99-1517, 2000 WL 987268, at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2000) (same).
233 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. England, 313 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
234 Compare Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims saved a notice of appeal filed after
the district court had decided only some of the claims), In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 289 (4th
Cir. 2005) (same), Equip. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Traverse Comput. Brokers, 973 F.2d 345, 347 (4th
Cir. 1992) (same), and Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 532 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification saved a premature notice of
appeal), with Turner v. Perry, 651 F. App'x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a notice of
appeal from a magistrate judge's report and recommendation could not be saved by the
district court's subsequent acceptance of that recommendation).
233 See Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding, without a
discussion of Rule 4(a)(2), that the defendant's relinquishment of all outstanding claims
during oral argument saved the notice of appeal filed after resolution of the plaintiffs claims
but before resolution of the defendant's counterclaims); Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 429
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a notice of appeal filed after claims against one defendant had
been dismissed but before claims against a second defendant were addressed was saved by
the later adjudication of all issues); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 104 F.3d 93, 95-96 (6th Cir.
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Seventh, 236 Eleventh, 237 and D.C. Circuits, 238 in contrast, have been
relatively consistent in their use of the intermediate approach.

1997) (holding that a premature notice of appeal was saved by a belated Rule 54(b)
certification).
236 Compare Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a notice of appeal filed after only some of the plaintiffs in a multi-plaintiff case had been
dismissed became effective after a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification), Runyon v. Applied
Extrusion Techs., Inc., 619 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a
notice of appeal filed after the court entered judgment in favor of one defendant but before
dismissing the other defendant), A. Bauer Mech., Inc. v. Joint Arbitration Bd., 562 F.3d 784,
789 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a notice of appeal filed after the district court had decided
several counterclaims for attorneys' fees, but before it decided the plaintiffs claims, ripened
when the court later decided all outstanding issues), Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co.,
378 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after
claims against one defendant were dismissed but before the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed
its claims against the remaining defendant), and McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the district court had
dismissed claims against one defendant but before it dismissed claims against other
defendants), with Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that
Rule 4(a)(2) does not save a notice of appeal filed after the district court granted a motion for
sanctions but reserved the calculation of fees).
237 Compare Schippers v. United States, 715 F.3d 879, 884-85 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
that a notice of appeal filed after the district court dismissed only some plaintiffs' complaints
in a consolidated case was saved by the other plaintiffs' claims being resolved), and Nat'l
Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1306-07
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the entry of a Rule 54(b) certification after a notice of appeal
had been filed from the order in question cured the premature notice of appeal), with PerezPriego v. Alachu Cty. Clerk of Court, 148 F.3d 1272, 1273 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Rule
4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after a magistrate judge had issued its report and
recommendation but before the district court adopted it).
238 Compare Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 221-23
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a notice of appeal filed after only third-party claims had been
resolved and other parties' claims remained was saved by a subsequent final judgment), and
Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 159-63 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding that a notice of appeal filed from an order granting summary judgment for some (but
not all) defendants was saved by the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims), with
Flynn v. Ohio Bldg. Restoration, Inc., 162 F. App'x 3, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that a
premature notice of appeal filed after the district court had determined liability but before it
calculated damages was not saved by the subsequent final judgment), and Holland v.
Williams Mountain Coal Co., No. 04-7092, 2004 WL 2713122, at *1, *1 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(holding that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after the district court had
ordered the payment of costs and fees but before it determined the amount of those costs and
fees). Cf. Duma v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 534 F. App'x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (in an
appeal from the Tax Court, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction when a party filed a
notice of appeal after the Tax Court had found the party liable but before it determined the
amount of liability; although Rule 4 did not apply to appeals from the Tax Court, "the court
decline [d] to exercise any discretion it might have because [the appellant's] case was not close
to a final judgment at the time she filed her notice of appeal").
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The Third Circuit, which generally adheres to the broader
approach, has also produced some inconsistent decisions and
uncertainty for litigants. 239 Many Third Circuit decisions hold that
the subsequent entry of a judgment can save notices filed after a
variety of district court orders so long as there is no prejudice to the
appellees. 240 But some Third Circuit decisions decline to apply the
broader approach on what often seem like arbitrary grounds. In
ADAPT of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, the
Third Circuit held that notices of appeal filed after the entry of
discovery orders were not saved by a later final judgment. 24 1 The
ADAPT court first concluded that Rule 4(a)(2) did not apply because
FirsTier classified discovery orders as clearly interlocutory orders
that Rule 4(a)(2) would not save. 242 It went on to acknowledge that
the Third Circuit's broader approach had saved notices of appeal
that Rule 4(a)(2) would not and made "no distinction between

239 Because it applies the broadest approach, some of the Third Circuit's decisions would of
course reach the same result under the intermediate or narrow approach. See, e.g., Marshall
v. Comm'r Pa. Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 92, 93 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that a notice
of appeal filed before the district court ruled on an issue was not saved by the subsequent
ruling); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig.(No. VI), 574 F. App'x 203, 205 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that the subsequent resolution of all outstanding claims saved a notice filed after
only some claims were resolved); In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
II), 751 F.3d 150, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a subsequent Rule 54(b) certification
saved a premature notice of appeal); Cherys v. United States, 552 F. App'x 162, 165-67 (3d
Cir. 2014) (holding that the subsequent entry of a final memorandum and order saved a notice
of appeal filed after the district court had orally denied relief); Gen. Ceramics Inc. v. Firemen's
Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the subsequent dismissal of
remaining defendants saved a prematurely filed notice of appeal); Batoff v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the conclusion of a period for amending
a complaint saved a notice of appeal filed before the conclusion of that period); New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1178 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
a notice of appeal filed before the district court addressed a defendant's crossclaims was saved
by the subsequent rejection of the crossclaims); Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that a promise at oral argument not to pursue claims dismissed without
prejudice saved a notice of appeal filed after some claims had been dismissed with prejudice
but others had been dismissed without).
240 See, e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
subsequent distribution of class settlement proceeds saved a premature notice of appeal filed
after the district court had approved the settlement but before it allocated proceeds); In re
Emerson Radio Corp., 52 F.3d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the subsequent dismissal of
an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding saved a notice of appeal filed from an order transferring
a case); cf. Khan v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 691 F.3d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the Third
Circuit's cumulative finality approach in an appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals).
241 ADAPT of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 2006).
242 Id. at 364.
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unalterably interlocutory (discovery) orders and orders that would
was
be final upon entry of judgment." 243 But it held that ADAPT244
different because the orders in question were discovery orders.
Similarly, in Adams v. Ford Motor Co., the Third Circuit held
that it lacked jurisdiction when a sanctioned attorney filed a notice
of appeal after the sanctions order but before the entry of a final
judgment. 245 According to the Adams court, Rule 4(a)(2) did not
save the premature notice because of the Supreme Court's
statement in FirsTierthat Rule 4(a)(2) does not permit "a notice of
appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision-such as a discovery
ruling or a sanctions order under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-to serve as a notice of appeal from a final
The court also declined to apply its broader
judgment. '246
cumulative finality approach, noting that it has held "that the
doctrine reflected in this line of cases does not authorize permitting
a premature notice of appeal from a clearly interlocutory order such
as a sanction order to ripen upon the entry of a final judgment on
'247
the merits.
But several Third Circuit decisions have allowed subsequent
events to save notices filed after clearly interlocutory orders.
Several cases have held, for example, that notices filed after a
determination of liability were saved by a subsequent calculation of
damages. 248 And in Lazy Oil, the Third Circuit held that a notice of
appeal filed after the district court had approved a class
settlement-but before it approved a plan for allocating the
settlement proceeds-was saved by the subsequent approval of an

243

Id.

244 Id. at 364-65. The court thought that applying its broader approach to discovery orders
would invite piecemeal appeals. Id. at 364. But the entry of a final judgment renders this
reasoning questionable.
245 Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 319 F. App'x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).
246 Id. (quoting FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991)).
247 Id.

248 See DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 213-16 (3d Cir. 2007); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 311 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Ragan
v. Tri-County Excavating, Inc., 62 F.3d 501, 505-06 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that a subsequent
calculation of attorneys' fees saved a premature notice of appeal filed after the district court
entered judgment). But see Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that Rule 4(a)(2) did not save a notice of appeal filed after the district court had awarded Rule
11 sanctions but before the court determined the amount of sanctions; the opinion did not
discuss the Third Circuit's broader approach to cumulative finality).
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allocation plan.249 These are indisputably interlocutory decisions
2 50
that cannot be certified for an immediate appeal under Rule 54(b).
The distinction drawn in ADAPT and Adams between interlocutory
and non-interlocutory orders doesn't hold. The only remaining
reason for these Third Circuit outliers is that the Supreme Court
25 1
mentioned discovery and sanction orders in FirsTier.
The Second Circuit, in contrast, has adhered consistently to the
broader approach. 252 Like the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit's
decisions generally allow subsequent events to save a premature
notice of appeal so long as (1) the district court has entered an
appealable judgment by the time the appeal is heard and (2) there
is no prejudice to the appellee. 253 It does not matter whether the
decision appealed from resolved all outstanding issues or could have
been saved by a Rule 54(b) certification. So in Berlin v. Renaissance
Rental Partners, LLC, the Second Circuit held that a notice of
appeal filed before the amount of attorneys' fees was determined
was saved by a later judgment setting the fees amount. 25 4 Similarly,
in Community Bank, N.A. v. Riffle, the court held that a notice of
appeal filed from a district court order affirming the bankruptcy
Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585-87 (3d Cir. 1999).
See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-46 (1976) (holding that a decision
on liability but leaving open the calculation of damages could not be certified for an immediate
appeal under Rule 54(b)).
251 FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991).
252 Like the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit's general adherence to the broader approach
means that several of its decisions would reach the same result under the intermediate or
narrow approach. See Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 223-25 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that Rule 4(a)(2) saved a notice of appeal filed after the court had dismissed a
complaint with leave to replead but before the subsequent order dismissing the complaint);
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
a notice of appeal filed after the district court had dismissed the claims against some (but not
all) defendants was saved by the later entry of a final judgment); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923
F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a notice of appeal filed after the dismissal of the
plaintiffs federal claims was saved by the subsequent dismissal of the plaintiffs remaining
state claims).
253 See, e.g., Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC, 723 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013);
Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Riffle, 617 F.3d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2010); Swede v. Rochester
Carpenters Pension Fund, 467 F.3d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 2006); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half Hollow
Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2002).
254 Berlin, 723 F.3d at 127-28. In a footnote, the court stated that while Rule 4 did "not
address this precise situation," it was "consistent with treating a premature notice of appeal,
filed after the entry of a judgment but before the judgment is amended to account for the
specific fee award, as effective once the judgment is amended to account for the fees amount."
Id. at 128 n.12. There was no discussion of FirsTier.
249
250
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court's denial of a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition ripened
upon the subsequent confirmation of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy
plan. 255 And in Swede v. Rochester CarpentersPension Fund, the
Second Circuit held that a premature notice of appeal filed after a
determination of liability but before a calculation of damages was
256
cured by the later disposition of all outstanding issues.
The courts of appeals are thus all over the map with cumulative
finality. In addition to disagreeing with each other, they often
disagree with themselves. And still the courts have not determined
the interaction between Rule 4(a)(2) and the common-law
cumulative finality doctrine. All of this demands a fix.
IV. FIXING CUMULATIVE FINALITY

As things currently stand, none of the approaches to cumulative
finality is satisfactory. The broader approach makes the best sense,
practically speaking, but it cannot be squared with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2) in FirsTier. The narrow and
intermediate approaches are more consistent with FirsTier,but
they fail to save premature notices of appeal-and thus deny any
opportunity for appellate review-when doing so would be
harmless. Add to these unsatisfactory approaches the current mess
in the courts of appeals' caselaw, and the current state of cumulative
finality is unacceptable.
At the root of both of these problems-the unsatisfactory
approaches and the inconsistent caselaw-is FirsTier. That
decision probably got the meaning of Rule 4(a)(2) wrong. Although
the rule's text is ambiguous and its historical purpose is unclear,
the best reading of Rule 4(a)(2) is one that allows a subsequent
judgment to save a premature notice filed after any district court
decision. So one of two things should happen: (1) the Supreme
Court should overrule FirsTier,or (2) the Rules Committee should
amend Rule 4(a)(2).

Riffle, 617 F.3d at 173-74.
Swede, 467 F.3d at 219-20; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 468 (2d
Cir. 2007) (holding that a notice filed after a partial grant of summary judgment was
ineffective because the district court had not entered an appealable judgment by the time the
appeal was heard); McManus v. Gitano Grp., Inc., 59 F.3d 382, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that the subsequent entry of a final judgment saved a notice of appeal filed from an order
denying the plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees).
255
256
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I spend much of this Part explaining why Rule 4(a)(2) should be
changed, either through judicial decision or rule amendment. But
ultimately, this cumulative finality situation is a symptom of a
larger problem. Uncertainty persists about when federal litigants
can appeal. Part of this uncertainty stems from the various times
at which litigants might be able to appeal before a final judgment.
The literature predominantly addresses this aspect of appellate
jurisdiction (though there is still much more to address). But this
uncertainty also stems from the difficulties in identifying when
district court proceedings have ended. This aspect of appellate
jurisdiction also needs some attention. And any reform effortsreform being the primary focus of the appellate jurisdiction
literature-must address the difficulty of defining a final,
appealable judgment. I accordingly end this Part with how
cumulative finality-its history, its issues, and the solution I
recommend-can contribute to that aspect of reform.
A. THE MISTAKES OF FIRSTIER

The Supreme Court made mistakes in deciding FirsTier. The
ultimate outcome was correct-the district court announced a
traditional final decision and the appellant filed its notice of appeal
before formal entry of the final judgment. 257 The Court rightly held
that the entry of the final judgment saved the premature notice,
whatever the approach to cumulative finality issues. 258 The Court
also recognized that Rule 4(a)(2) meant to codify an existing practice
in the courts of appeals. 259 And the Court correctly understood that
a premature notice of appeal often does no harm and thus should
26 0
rarely be the basis for refusing to hear an appeal.
But the Court made some missteps in its reasoning. The Court
first speculated that unskilled litigants were the intended
beneficiaries of Rule 4(a)(2). This speculation stemmed from the
several cases cited in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule

257
258
259

FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 272 (1991).

Id. at 277.
Id. at 273.

Id. ("[U]nlike a tardy notice of appeal, certain premature notices do not prejudice the
appellee and . .. the technical defect of prematurity therefore should not be allowed to
extinguish an otherwise proper appeal.").
260
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4(a)(2). 2 61 According to the Supreme Court, these citations "suggest
that Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to protect the unskilled litigant who
files a notice of appeal from a decision that he reasonably but
mistakenly believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a
notice of appeal from the actual final judgment. '262 Given this
intention, the Court then stated that the focus of the inquiry should
be on the unskilled litigant's reasonable-but-mistaken belief that
263
the decision appealed from was a final judgment.
Immediately after mentioning unskilled litigants and their
mistaken-but-reasonable beliefs, the Court noted that Rule 4(a)(2)
would not save a notice of appeal from every order, giving discovery
and sanction rulings as examples. 264 A notice from these orders, the
Court thought, would not "serve as a notice of appeal from the final
judgment" because "[a] belief that such a decision is a final
judgment would not be reasonable." 265 That is, Rule 4(a)(2) would
not apply to appeals from interlocutory discovery or sanction orders
because no reasonable litigant could think those orders are final
judgments. The focus, it then seemed, was on whether a litigant
might reasonably think the order appealed from was a final
judgment.
The Court's line of thought-from unskilled litigants, to
reasonable-but-mistaken beliefs, to final judgments-narrowed
Rule 4(a)(2)'s application to appeals from decisions that look like a
final judgment. And it produced the line often quoted as FirsTier's
holding: "Rule 4(a)(2) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal
decision to operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only
when a district court announces a decision that would be appealable
if immediately followed by the entry of judgment."266 Given all this
attention to whether a party might reasonably believe that the
order appealed from was a final judgment, it's no surprise that
FirsTierhas been commonly read to reject the broader approach to
cumulative finality.

262

Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.

263

Id.

264

Id.

261

265
266

Id.
Id.
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But this reasoning is questionable from its start. It's not at all
clear from the cited cases that Rule 4(a)(2) was intended to protect
what the Court characterized as "unskilled litigants." Only one of
the cited cases involved an appellant proceeding pro se. 26 7 The rest
appear to have involved appellants represented by counsel. 268 One
case involved a $1.5 million contract dispute (in early-1960s
dollars). 269 Another involved an appeal by a lawyer, represented by
outside counsel, attempting to quash a subpoena issued to his
firm. 270 While there's no way of knowing how experienced the
litigants in these cases (or their counsel) were, it's not at all obvious
that they were amateurs.
And even if they were, it's also not clear from these cases that
Rule 4(a)(2) addressed only appeals from what litigants mistakenly
thought was a final judgment. Admittedly, the cases cited deal with
situations in which the appellants might have thought they were
appealing from a final judgment. But these cases were given only
as examples. Other cases from this era gave effect to notices filed
from orders that were nowhere close to a final judgment. 271 There's
no evidence that the Advisory Committee meant to reject these
decisions.
Perhaps this is all too critical of the FirsTier decision. After all,
the Court correctly answered the dispute before it, and it's not
entirely clear that the Court intended FirsTier to be the final and
definitive say on what Rule 4(a)(2) means. Then-Judge Gorsuch,
writing for the Tenth Circuit in In re Woolsey, has suggested as
much. 272 He characterized FirsTier's discussion of Rule 4(a)(2)'s
limits as "cryptic and arguably tangential" and noted that the
opinion is "open to many different understandings. ' 273 Gorsuch also
suggested that the Supreme Court's statements about "clearly

See generally Ruby v. Sec'y of U.S. Navy, 365 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1966).
See generally In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976);
Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1975); Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 F.2d 1098 (9th
Cir. 1971); Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1965).
269 Firchau,345 F.2d at 270.
270 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d at 376.
271 See supra Part IJ.B.1.
272 In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 2012).
267
268

273

Id.
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interlocutory orders" like discovery and sanction orders were not
274
necessary to the holding and thus dicta.
Whatever the Supreme Court meant to do in FirsTier, the
decision has resulted in the current mess.
B. THE BETTER INTERPRETATION OF RULE 4(A)(2)

So what should FirsTierhave said? The meaning of Rule 4(a)(2)
is not obvious. The Advisory Committee intended to capture some
part of the common-law cumulative finality doctrine that existed in
1979-that much is clear from the Committee's Notes, 275 as the
Supreme Court acknowledged in FirsTier.276 But neither the text
nor history of the rule clearly define Rule 4(a)(2)'s scope.
Starting with the text, it alone does not answer the question. The
rule says only that a notice "filed after the court announces a
decision or order-but before the entry of the judgment or order-is
treated as filed on the date of and after the entry."277 The problem
is that it doesn't specify which decisions or orders it applies to, or
what precisely it means by entry of a "judgment or order." 278 And
the rule can be read multiple ways.
Let's put aside for a moment the rule's two uses of the word
"order" and focus only on the terms "decision" and "judgment." One
plausible reading of these two terms is that they refer to
substantively identical actions, differing only in that the "decision"
is oral and the "judgment" is written. Judgments normally mark
the resolution of all outstanding issues in the district court. So a
substantively identical decision would resolve all outstanding
issues in the district court. In other words, "decision" would refer
to a traditional final decision. This interpretation would support
the narrow approach to cumulative finality.

274 Id.
(citing Gonzales v. Texaco, Inc., 344 F. App'x 304, 307 (9th Cir. 2009) (suggesting
that the same language is dicta)); see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3950.5
("Perhaps the FirsTier Court's statement can be read merely as warning that a notice
designating a challenge to a Rule 11 sanction will not be read to encompass other matters
that are ultimately included in the final judgment .....
275
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee's note to 1979 amendment (noting that "the
courts of appeals quite generally have held premature appeals effective").
276 FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv'rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273 (1991).
277

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2).

See Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (noting that FirsTier left a "vast middle ground of uncertainty" about the orders to
which Rule 4(a)(2) applies).
278
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Or one could read "judgment" a bit more broadly to include those
decisions that could be certified under Rule 54(b). Otherwise,
sticking with the previous interpretation would mean that the
decision and the subsequent judgment would still be substantively
identical. So if a judgment could mark the resolution of some (but
not all) claims in a multi-claim or multi-party suit, the
substantively identical decision would be what resolves those
claims. The decision resolving the claims would be interlocutory
until certified, at which point there is an appealable judgment. This
reading would, of course, support the intermediate approach.
Or the terms could plausibly be read more broadly. "Decision"
could mean any decision the district court makes in the course of
litigation-interlocutory or otherwise. "Judgment" would then refer
to the final judgment that ends district court proceedings. Under
such a reading, the decision and the judgment would not need to be
substantively identical; a judgment embodies all prior district court
decisions, so it conceptually includes the decisions appealed from
(and all other decisions). Under this reading, an appeal filed after
any district court decision would be treated as filed after the entry
of a final judgment. This reading would support the broad
approach.
Adding the two uses of "order" to the mix only further muddies
Rule 4(a)(2)'s text. Much like the terms "decision" and "judgment,"
it's not clear whether the two "orders" must be substantively
identical. One interpretation would be that they must; the first
"order" refers to an oral decision by the district court while the
second refers to the entry of a written order on the docket. But this
interpretation doesn't make much sense. Most orders are entered
before a judgment, and they are not immediately appealable;
litigants must wait until a final judgment before appealing. So
treating a notice filed after the announcement of an order as if filed
after entry of the written order would still often result in a notice
filed before a final judgment. In other words, the notice would still
be premature. Under this reading, the only time these terms would
do any work is when an exception to the final-judgment rule allows
an order to be immediately appealed.
These exceptions are
relatively rare, however, so these terms would have limited
application.
The two uses of "order" could also be read more broadly. The first
two terms-"decision" and the first use of "order"--could refer to any
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decision the district court makes before entering a judgment or an
appealable order. The second two-"judgment" and the second use
of "order"-could refer to the entry of that judgment or appealable
order. This reading of Rule 4(a)(2) would mean that any notice of
appeal filed before entry of a judgment or an appealable order would
be saved by the later entry of that judgment or order.
We can get even more technical and minute (and probably
needlessly complicated) by studying the articles that come before
the two groups of terms-the rule first speaks of "a" decision or
order being announced, followed by entry of "the" judgment or
order. 279 But the point is made. Rule 4(a)(2) does not specify
precisely when it applies or what it's supposed to do. It's ambiguous.
So the text does not give Rule 4(a)(2) a clear meaning.
As for the rule's history, it at least suggests the possibility of the
broader approach, though it is hardly conclusive. As detailed in
Part II, Rule 4(a)(2) was added to the rules against a backdrop of
courts developing the cumulative finality doctrine, 280 and the
Advisory Committee intended to capture at least some parts of that
But there was no single, definitively
developing doctrine. 28 1
established cumulative finality doctrine in 1979. Some early
cumulative finality decisions addressed the now-settled matter of
notices filed after the dismissal of a complaint but before the
dismissal of an action. 28 2 Others addressed the announcement of a
decision that resolves all outstanding issues and leaves only the
entry of a final judgment (the specific situation in FirsTierand the
scope of the current narrow approach). 28 3 Other early decisions
279 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). As to the terms "order" and "judgment," the articles reveal little.
One could just as easily interpret the phrase "the" judgment to refer back to the decision,
meaning that the actions are substantively identical. Or, since a district court often makes
many decisions but only one judgment, the use of "a" before "decision" could encompass all
district court decisions in the course of litigation, and the use of "the" before "judgment" could
refer to the final judgment. Again, adding the "orders" to the mix further complicates the
analysis. Because they are the same word, one could read the use of "the order" to refer back
to the previous use of the word "order." Such a reading would support the argument that the
orders must be substantively identical, with one orally announced and the other entered.
280 See supra Part II.B.1.
281 See FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee's note to 1979 amendment.
282 See Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716, 717 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Sec'y of U.S.
Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1966); Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269,
270-71 (9th Cir. 1965).
283 See Sanchez v. Maher, 560 F.2d 1105, 1107 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury
Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1976); Dougherty v. Harper's
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addressed orders that could have been certified for an immediate
appeal under Rule 54(b) (the scope of the current intermediate
approach). 28 4 And still others applied the cumulative finality
doctrine to clearly interlocutory decisions (the scope of the current
28 5
broad approach).
So it's not clear what exactly the Advisory Committee intended
to codify. The Committee's Notes to Rule 4(a)(2) cited five examples
of courts giving effect to premature notices of appeal. 28 6 Those
examples, which came from three of the four just-discussed groups
of cases, shed only some light on the Committee's intent:
•

*

*

Ruby v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy and Firchau
v. Diamond National Corp. both held that a
notice of appeal was effective when it was filed
after the dismissal of a complaint but before
28 7
dismissal of the action.
In re Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975
and Hodge v. Hodge both held that a notice of
appeal was effective when it was filed after the
district court announced its decision but before
288
formal entry of a written order.
Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg held that a notice of
appeal filed while a motion for a new trial was
pending became effective when that motion was
28 9
denied.

Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 1976); Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir.
1975); Markham v. Holt, 369 F.2d 940, 941-42 (5th Cir. 1966).
284 See Tilden Fin. Corp. v. Palo Tire Serv., Inc., 596 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1979); Merchs.
& Planters Bank of Newport v. Smith, 516 F.2d 355, 356 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam);
Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 285-86 (2d Cir. 1974); Jetco Elec. Indus.,
Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973).
285 See Yaretsky v. Blum, 5.92 F.2d 65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1979); Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg,
437 F.2d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1971); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 1968);
Curtis Gallery & Library, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1967).
286 See FED. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee's note to 1979 amendment.
287 Ruby v. Sec'y of U.S. Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 387-89 (9th Cir. 1966); Firchau v. Diamond
Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1965).
288 In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d at 376-77; Hodge v. Hodge, 507
F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1975).
289 Song Jook Suh, 437 F.2d at 1099-1101.
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The first four of these cases would have reached the same outcome
under the current narrow or intermediate approaches to cumulative
finality. In all of them, district court proceedings had essentially
reached their end; the complaint was dismissed or the district court
had announced a decision resolving all outstanding claims. The
subsequent event-the dismissal of the action or formal entry of a
final judgment (or both)-was relatively insignificant, marking the
formal end of a proceeding that had effectively already reached that
point.
Song Jook Suh, however, was different. In Song Jook Suh, the
plaintiff filed his notice while a motion for a new trial was
pending. 290 When Song Jook Suh was decided in 1971, a motion for
a new trial terminated the running of the time for filing a notice of
appeal, and the full time for filing a notice commenced upon the
denial of the motion. 291 Had the district court granted the motion,
292
its grant of summary judgment would not have been appealable.
So at the time the plaintiff in Song Jook Suh filed his notice of
appeal, the case was not essentially over. More than a formality
remained. But on appeal, the court determined that the motion for
a new trial, since it was not ultimately granted, merely delayed the
time by which the notice of appeal needed to be filed. 293 The notice
referred to the only judgment, and "[t]o hold, under such
circumstances, that the notice of appeal [was] void, and that [the
294
court] ha[d] no jurisdiction, would be technical in the extreme.
The citation to Song Jook Suh thus suggests a broader approach
to cumulative finality than that of the narrow and intermediate
approaches. Although the specific situation faced in Song Jook Suh
cannot now recur-current Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)
addresses what happens to a notice of appeal filed while a motion
for a new trial is pending 295-the situation was one that could not
have been saved under the narrow or intermediate approaches.
That being said, Song Jook Suh only suggests, rather than

290
291

Id. at 1099.
Id. (quoting a prior version of Rule 4(a)).

292

Id.

293

Id.

294 Id.; see also Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
premature notice of appeal was saved by the subsequent denial of an outstanding Rule 59(e)
motion, given that there was no prejudice to the appellee).
295 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
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articulates, a broader approach, and so one cannot place too much
significance on its citation.
Similarly, as for the Committee's use of a "for example" citation,
it only leaves open the possibility that the Committee intended a
broader approach. The courts of appeals had issued several other
cumulative finality decisions by 1979. Some of them applied the
broader approach. But not all of them. Without an idea of what
other examples the Committee might have referred to, the Advisory
Committee Notes leave the question of Rule 4(a)(2)'s scope
unanswered.
What remains, then, is to ask what interpretation of the rule
makes the most sense as a policy matter. On that front, the broader
approach comes out ahead.
The problem with the narrow and intermediate approaches is
that they deprive litigants of their opportunity for appellate review.
The right to appeal is widely regarded as a valuable one, and
deprivation of it can leave district court errors uncorrected and
parties deprived of the relief they're due. The narrow and
intermediate approaches sometimes deny the opportunity for
appellate review on a highly technical error. It's not as if the party
did not file a notice of appeal at all. The notice was filed, but it was
filed at the wrong time. This means pro se litigants might lose their
chance to appeal even though they filed a notice. Even lawyers are
not always sure about the proper time for filing a notice of appeal,
as illustrated by the many cases in which a premature notice creates
an issue. These mistakes might sometimes seem unreasonable to
those versed in the intricacies of federal appellate procedure. But
they happen. And these mistakes are depriving parties of appellate
review on a technicality.
Technicalities can be important, particularly in the procedural
context. But the punishment for a procedural misstep should
generally fit the crime. 296 The misstep here-filing a premature
notice of appeal-generally does little (if any) harm.' Similarly
harmless is allowing subsequent events to save them. Indeed, of the
four potential harms of premature notices of appeal, only one has
any real merit.

296 See Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that "the
punishment should be fitted to the crime" in a case involving a complaint that did not meet
the technical requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8).
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First, an early notice of appeal does not cause the problems of a
late one. The timing requirements make perfect sense insofar as
they limit how long after a final judgment a party can file a notice.
These limits create reasonable and beneficial reliance interests;
once the time for appealing a judgment has passed, the parties can
rely on the finality of the district court's decision and move on with
their lives. These limits also ensure that federal litigation moves at
an acceptable pace; parties must make the decision to appeal
relatively quickly, which gets the appeal moving and the dispute
closer to a final resolution.
An early notice, in contrast, rarely implicates these concerns. An
early notice of appeal does not disrupt any settled expectations of
finality. The district court's decision is not even final, so no one
should have any reliance interests to upset. Nor does an early notice
risk slowing down the pace of litigation by dragging out the time
between district court and appellate proceedings.
Second, an early notice of appeal generally does not allow
appellants to dispute subsequent orders. A notice of appeal's
primary purpose is to give notice (hence the name) of a litigant's
intention to appeal. Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) requires that
a notice specify the decision or decisions being appealed. 297 If a
decision is not fairly presented in the notice, the appellant is deemed
to have forfeited the matter for appeal. 298 So parties are generally
limited to disputing the decisions specified in the notice. This
requirement makes perfect sense insofar as it informs the court and
parties of the issues relevant to the appeal.
Premature notices create no unique problems because this
requirement applies to them with equal force. Courts in cumulative
finality cases have generally limited parties to disputing only the
decisions specified in the notice; parties cannot dispute district
299
court decisions made after the notice unless they file a new one.

FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B) ("The notice of appeal must.., designate the judgment, order,
or part thereof being appealed ... ").
298 See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 3949.4 (noting that care should be taken when
complying with Rule 3 "because failure to do so can forfeit appellate review").
299 See, e.g., Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2009) (limiting appellate review
to the dismissal of only one defendant when the notice of appeal was filed after the dismissal
of that defendant); Warfield v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Where the appellant notices the appeal of a specified judgment only or a part thereof.., this
297
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So cumulative finality cases should present no surprises for the
court or the parties of what is at issue in the appeal. Premature
notices thus fulfill their notice-providing purpose just as much as
those that come shortly after a final judgment. There should be no
worry that, as one judge doubting the wisdom of cumulative finality
once put it, "a plaintiff [would] file[] his notice of appeal as an
appendage to his original complaint" and be able to appeal from a
later judgment. 30 0
Third, premature notices of appeal do not create risks of
piecemeal review. The final-judgment rule generally limits federal
litigants to a single appeal in which all issues can be addressed.
Litigants cannot seek review of individual issues in a series of
separate appeals-what are known as piecemeal appeals. 30 1 And
rightfully so. Federal appellate courts are busy enough deciding a
single appeal per case; allowing multiple appeals from a single case
risks greatly enhancing their workload. And often it's more efficient
to hear all issues at once-the issues can be decided by the same
panel of judges, who need to become familiar with the case only
302
once.
A broad approach to cumulative finality does not increase the
risk of piecemeal appeals. Under any approach to cumulative
finality, the district court must have entered an appealable order
before the appeal is decided.3 0 3 Normally this means the district
court has issued a final judgment, resolving all outstanding issues
in the case. And if district court proceedings have reached a final
judgment, there's no risk of any additional appeals from that casethe only matter the parties sought to appeal is now before the court
of appeals, and everything else has been left as decided in the
district court. Indeed, in the only instance when district courts have

court has no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly referred
to and which are not impliedly intended for appeal .... ").
300 Ruby v. Sec'y of U.S. Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1966) (Chambers, J., concurring);
see also United States v. Hansen, 795 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1986) ('The taxpayers, anticipating
defeat, might as well have filed the notice of appeal simultaneously with the filing of their
counterclaims or their answer to the government's complaint.").
3o See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956) (describing the
"historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals").
302 See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors
in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
303 See, e.g., Marshall v. Comm'r Pa. Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding
that a notice of appeal filed before the district court had made any decision on the disputed
issue could not be saved by subsequent events).
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not reached a final judgment-when the district court certifies an
order for appeal under Rule 54(b)-the certification is what creates
the potential for multiple appeals, not any application of the
cumulative finality doctrine.
Fourth and finally, although there is some risk of bogging down
litigation while the courts and parties determine the effect of a
premature notice, a clearer rule would probably obviate that issue.
As the law currently stands, premature notices can cause some
disruption in the district court and court of appeals. Normally, the
filing of a proper notice of appeal transfers the case from the district
court to the court of appeals and deprives the district court of
jurisdiction to proceed. If the parties are unsure whether a
premature notice is proper, they and the courts might spend time
and energy figuring the matter out. A broader approach to
cumulative finality does not discourage early filings of notices of
appeal. So a broader approach is likely to result in more premature
notices. These could disrupt proceedings as the parties and the
court figure out what to do with them.
But the problem is not with the broader approach. This
disruption already occurs. And it stems from uncertainty about
what to do with a premature notice. A clearer cumulative finality
rule-no matter its content-would largely solve this problem.
Thus, as many early cumulative finality decisions noted, giving
effect to premature notices does little harm.30 4 That's why courts so
rarely (if ever) determine that giving effect to a premature notice
causes any prejudice. The broad approach to cumulative finality
thus does little harm. What little harm it might cause can be
reduced through a clear rule governing this situation. Given this
minimal harm, the narrow and intermediate approaches are
unnecessarily harsh. Rule 4(a)(2) should be read to adopt the
broader approach.

304 Although cumulative finality has not been extensively examined in the appellate
jurisdiction literature until now, others have noted that giving effect to a premature notice of
appeal often causes minimal (if any) harm. See, e.g., 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9,
§ 3914.9 ("The results reached in these cases are surely right. The premature appeal has not
in fact interfered with the progress of the case in the district court; the court of appeals need
not worry that it will have to become familiar with the case again, decide an issue that might
be mooted by further trial court proceedings, or decide an issue that might be better
illuminated by further trial proceedings; the parties have full notice of the intention to
appeal.").
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The solution to the cumulative finality problem, then, is to fix
Rule 4(a)(2). This could happen two ways.
First, the Supreme Court could take an appropriate case and
overrule FirsTier. The Court could then interpret Rule 4(a)(2) to
adopt the broader approach, which is its best reading. Although the
courts of appeals might be able to fix this problem on their own, the
amount of work that would take-and the number of cases that
would be overturned-probably makes it most efficient to go
through the Supreme Court.
Second, the Rules Committee could amend Rule 4(a)(2) to clearly
adopt the broader approach. The current rule reads:
(2) Filing Before Entry of Judgment. A notice of
appeal filed after the court announces a decision
or order-but before the entry of the judgment or
order-is treated as filed on the date of and after
30 5
the entry.
As amended, the new rule might read:
(2) Filing Before Entry of Judgment. A notice of
appeal filed before the court enters the judgment
or appealable order that would allow review of
the appealed decision is treated as filed on the
date of and after the entry of that judgment or
order.
Such a rule would unambiguously adopt the broader approach. It
would apply to any notice filed before a party could appeal. And that
notice would be saved by the subsequent entry of a judgment or
appealable order.
D. DEFINING A FINAL JUDGMENT

The current cumulative finality mess is only one of several in the
current federal appellate jurisdiction regime. By most accounts,

305

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2).
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that entire system is a mess; 30 6 it's simply too complicated and
confusing for the average litigant. 3 7 Part of this complexity comes
from the variety of rules governing when a party can appeal. As
already mentioned, the final-judgment rule is only a general rule.
It has many exceptions that allow litigants to appeal before a final
judgment. Some exceptions are in statutes. 30 8 Others are in rules
of procedure. 30 9 And some come from judicial decisions. 3 10 Some
apply only to specific types of orders, 3 11 while others can conceivably
306 See Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation, supranote 15, at 423; Steinman,
supra note 15, at 1238-39.
307 See Carrington, supra note 15, at 165-66 (noting "the unconscionable intricacy of the
existing law, depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next");
Cooper, supra note 15, at 157 ("The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a
list of elaborations, expansions, evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its
complexity."); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 15, at 291 (calling the current system
"arcane and confusing"); Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that the
exceptions to the final-judgment rule "creat[e] an immense, complex, and confusing web of
appellate jurisdiction"); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 15, at 1651 (noting the
"labyrinthian conglomeration of jurisdictional rules"); Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the
FederalFinality-AppealabilityProblem, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 171, 172
("The existing federal finality-appealability situation is an unacceptable morass."); Waters,
supra note 15, at 556 (noting the "dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created [finality]
exceptions").
308 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), for example, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals
from "[i]nterlocutory orders .. granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). The
Federal Arbitration Act permits immediate appeals from interlocutory orders involving
arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012). And a district court can certify for immediate review
an interlocutory order in a civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) so long as the order involves
"a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and.., an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance.., the litigation." 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
309 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allows for immediate appeals from district court
orders granting or denying class certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). And Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) authorizes a district court to enter a final judgment for some (but not all) of
the claims or parties in a case "if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay," thereby allowing an immediate appeal from orders that would otherwise have to
wait for a final judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
310 The major judge-made exception to the final-judgment rule is the collateral order
doctrine. See Lammon, Rules, Standards,and Experimentation,supra note 15, at 431 (calling
the collateral order doctrine "the most common and most maligned exception to the final
judgment rule"). Although the exact requirements of that doctrine can vary from case to case,
it generally allows immediate appeals from types of orders that are conclusively decided in
the district court, separate from the merits of the trial court proceedings, and effectively
unreviewable after a final judgment. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100,
106 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
311 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (allowing appeals of certain orders regarding arbitration); FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(f) (allowing appeals of orders regarding class-action certification).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/3

62

Lammon: Cumulative Finality

2018]

CUMULATIVE FINALITY

829

apply to any order. 312 Some exceptions provide an appeal as of
right. 313 Others give the courts of appeals discretion over whether
314
to hear the appeal.
The current state of affairs-a general final-judgment rule and a
motley crew of exceptions-has been a regular target of criticism
and reform efforts (including my own). 315 Those reform efforts have
largely focused on two issues: (1) what types of orders should be
appealable before a final judgment,31 6 and (2) what form rules
17
governing those appeals should take.
But there's another side to the current appellate jurisdiction
mess. Despite efforts to make it clear when the time for filing a
notice of appeal begins, litigants continue to make mistakes.
Appeals at the end of district court proceedings-and specifically,
identifying when those proceedings have ended-raise their own
issues. The current cumulative finality mess is only one illustration
of this aspect of appellate jurisdiction. And this aspect of appellate
jurisdiction has received much less attention in the literature than
appeals before a final judgment.

312 Extraordinary writs are available in essentially all cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
Other exceptions apply relatively broadly, such as those for appeals regarding injunctive
relief and certified appeals. See id. § 1292(a)(1) (allowing appeals of interlocutory orders
regarding injunctions); id. § 1292(b) (allowing district judges to certify orders for appeal in
civil cases).
313 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), for example, gives litigants the right to appeal orders "granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Under the collateral order doctrine, government officials
have a right to appeal the denial of qualified immunity to the extent the denial turns on an
issue of law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 530 (1985). That doctrine also gives a right to appeal in several other situations,
including the denials of state sovereign immunity, immunity under the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy clause, and immunity under the Constitution's speech or debate clause. See
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (state
sovereign immunity); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1979) (speech or debate
clause immunity); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1977) (double jeopardy).
314 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. C1V. P. 23(f).
315 See sources cited supra note 16.
316 See generally, e.g., Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 15 (discussing appeals of

orders regarding the disclosure of allegedly privileged information); Pollis, Multidistrict
Litigation,supra note 15 (discussing appeals of decisions in multidistrict litigation cases).
317 See generally, e.g., Glynn, supra note 15 (advocating rules-based reform for the law of
federal appellate jurisdiction); Martineau, supra note 15 (arguing for discretionary appellate
jurisdiction); Steinman, supranote 15 (arguing largely for a system of appellate jurisdiction
with some mandatory appeals).
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The literature-and the concomitant reform efforts-should pay
more attention to this other side of federal appellate jurisdiction.
Indeed, a key piece of any successful reform will be redefining a
final, appealable judgment. For example, I have suggested a system
based on the structure of the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of
Evidence: a general rule about when litigants can appeal as of right
coupled with a series of exceptions that allow appeals at other points
in district court proceedings. 3 18 This could even be capped with a
catchall provision, like Evidence Rule 807, that gives the courts of
appeals guided discretion to hear an interlocutory appeal. 3 19 Under
this system, appellants must identify the rule that gives the court
of appeals jurisdiction over the case.
None of this would work, however, without a baseline rule-a
relatively clear and easily identifiable point in district court
proceedings when parties have a right to appeal. I do not yet have
the answer for when this point would be. The old Rule 58, which
required entry of a written judgment before the time for filing a
notice of appeal began, might be worth considering.3 20 But this side
of appellate jurisdiction must be explored if a new, workable
baseline is to exist.
V. CONCLUSION

The current cumulative finality situation is unacceptable. The
Supreme Court or the Rules Committee should fix it. I have used
this Article to explain how. The best way to approach matters of
cumulative finality is to allow a subsequent judgment to save any
prematurely filed notices of appeal. Doing so will cause little harm
(if any) and will avoid depriving parties of their opportunity for
appellate review.

Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 6, at 415-16.
Id.
320 See FED. R. APP. P. 58 advisory committee's note to 2002 amendment (explaining changes
to the old Rule 58 with respect to entering the judgment and the time to appeal under Rule
318

319

4(a)).
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